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ABSTRACT 
Despite the critical role of regulations on competition and innovation, little is known about firm 
responses and related effects on performance under regulatory contingencies that are permissive or 
restrictive. By longitudinally investigating hybrid cars competing in the Le Mans Prototype racing (LMP1), 
we counter-intuitively suggest that permissive regulations increase technological uncertainty and thus 
decrease the firms’ likelihood of shifting their technological trajectory, while restrictive regulations lead to 
the opposite outcome. Further, we suggest that permissive regulations favour firms that innovate their 
products by sequentially upgrading core and peripheral subsystems, while restrictive regulations—in the 
long term— favour firms upgrading them simultaneously. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. 
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FIRM TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO REGULATORY CHANGES:  
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY IN THE LE MANS PROTOTYPE RACING 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A traditional stream of research in management literature investigates how firms respond to 
environmental changes and competition by exploring different innovation opportunities (Andriopoulos and 
Lewis, 2009; Blind et al., 2017; Dosi, 1982; Gupta et al., 2006; March, 1991; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2007). 
Firms’ responses are indeed critical in competitive settings, particularly when winning or losing is driven by 
technological innovation (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Jenkins, 2010; Marino et al., 2015; Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004).  
One essential aspect for a firm’s success in a competitive environment is striking the optimal degree of 
exploration to maximize performance (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). In technological arenas, a firm’s 
exploration has been traditionally defined as the level of innovation—in products, technologies, solutions—
that the firm advances beyond the knowledge baseline of its competitive setting (Benner and Tushman, 2002; 
Marino et al., 2015). Scholars have identified in many cases curvilinear returns from exploratory innovation, 
so that beyond an optimal point returns might plateau, or even turn negative (Gupta et al., 2006; Posen and 
Levinthal, 2012). Research highlights that this optimal point is a “moving target” that varies as 
environmental changes occur (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). Striking such a moving target by deploying the 
right amount (and type) of innovation to maximize performance is particularly difficult, particularly in 
dynamic contingencies (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Davis et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2006). To 
overcome this challenge, it is thus necessary to fully understand the structure and nature of environmental 
shifts (McCarthy et al., 2010).  
According to previous studies, environmental change can arise from a variety of different sources 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; McCarthy et al., 2010) and may involve different dimensions, such as 
distinctive frequencies (Posen and Levinthal, 2012) or divergent magnitudes (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). Among other environmental changes, regulatory frameworks (Amable et al., 2016; Blind, 2012; Blind 
et al., 2017; Mahon and Murray, 1981; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Ramaswamy et al., 1994; Reger et 
al., 1992; Smith and Grimm, 1987; Teece, 1986) directly affect and concern several major industries such as 
automotive, transportations, farming, chemicals, banking, pharmaceutical and defence—among others—and 
have been extensively leveraged to preserve the environment (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). Recent studies show 
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that firms competing in regulated and technology-driven settings maximize their performance by engaging 
with moderate levels of exploration as regulatory changes turn radical (Marino et al., 2015). In these studies, 
however, regulatory changes are considered only by their change in magnitude, and not by the potential 
differences in the direction (i.e., the actual content) of the rule change (Mahon and Murray, 1981; Reger et 
al., 1992). In fact, from the regulators’ perspective—which we adopt in our study—regulatory changes can 
have at least two main objectives, namely they could be more restrictive (i.e., by reducing and binding the 
agents’ allowances and actions) or permissive (i.e., by increasing the agents’ freedom, or in simple terms by 
‘deregulating’ a specific domain of activity).  
Research seems to agree that regulations—both whether permissive or restrictive—stimulate innovation 
at the firm level (Aggarwal, 2000; Blind et al., 2017; Hart and Ahuja, 1996), as organizations exploratory 
responses usually manage to find ways to work both ‘within’ or ‘around’ regulatory frameworks (Jenkins, 
2014a; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). It is however unclear whether restrictive regulatory enforcement in 
a specific domain (e.g., road cars gas emissions) might hold contrasting effects on competition compared to 
shift towards deregulation. For example, one could wonder whether such changes would favour firms that 
respond by deploying radical (e.g., electrical and hybrid vehicles) rather than incremental innovations (e.g., 
traditional combustion engine optimizations). In such contexts, the system complexity of the product 
architecture also plays an important role, (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Simon, 
1962; Zirpoli and Camuffo, 2009), but it is not clear whether firms might obtain an advantage in engaging 
with core (e.g., car engine) rather than peripheral subsystems (e.g., gearbox, hybrid systems) within the 
overall product architecture (Murmann and Frenken, 2006).  
We claim that firms’ compliance with increasing or decreasing limitations might differently affect 
organizational responses as well as the optimal type of innovation that maximizes performance. However, 
research still lacks an understanding of such phenomenon, particularly in a longitudinal perspective (Blind, 
2012, p. 391). In this study, we thus investigate the following research question: What are the firms’ superior 
responses in terms of technological innovation when regulatory changes are characterized by different 
directions (i.e., restrictive vs. permissive)?  
If previous literature mentions the importance of studying the magnitude of environmental change —
i.e., ‘how large’ the shock is— (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Dosi, 1982; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) as 
well as the frequency—i.e., ‘how often’ new shifts happen—(Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007; Posen and 
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Levinthal, 2012), the direction of change—i.e., ‘what kind’ of variation—is rarely studied. More 
importantly, prior studies have already warned scholars about the importance of refraining from “lumping 
together” multiple dimensions of change (McCarthy et al., 2010, p. 610), but rather paying careful attention 
to the individual dynamics that each of them entails. In these regards, our investigation aims to provide a 
valuable contribution in understanding the fine-grained mechanisms involving regulations and firm 
exploratory innovation, as regulatory change is one of the key dimensions of environmental change both for 
theory (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; 2014a; McCarthy et al., 2010; Ramaswamy et al., 1994) and 
practice (Jenkins, 2014a; Stewart, 1993) across multiple disciplines and industries. Further, providing a 
response to our research question is not trivial, as—beyond the specific firm’s innovation responses—several 
factors might influence the final outcome for organizations. Above other aspects, scholars warn to consider 
that the value of prior experience and knowledge (see among others Balconi, 2002; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Grant, 1996; King and Tucci, 2002; Zahra and George, 2002) as well as to its position within a 
particular technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982; Jenkins and Floyd, 2001), whose pace might be accelerated 
in hypercompetitive settings (D'Aveni, 1994; Hoisl et al., 2017; Volberda, 1996). 
In this paper we classify firm’s exploration strategies in terms of radical vs. incremental innovations 
that might be related to changes in a specific technological product (Henderson and Clark, 1990). To reach a 
more nuanced understanding we also identify whether the change affects a subsystem that is core or 
peripheral to the overall product architecture (Murmann and Frenken, 2006, p. 940). Such innovations will 
be analysed in a setting where regulatory releases vary in terms of magnitude (i.e., radical vs. incremental), 
but also direction (i.e., permissive vs. restrictive), while frequency of regulation release is kept constant (i.e., 
once a year), and predictability is equal for all rivals (i.e., all firms learn about the new rule change around 
two years before their enforcement). In doing so, we want to specifically isolate the role played by the 
direction of change, due to its relevance for firms operating in settings where regulations may influence the 
nature of competitive dynamics (Blind et al., 2017; Ramaswamy et al., 1994; Stewart, 2010). Finally, given 
the hypercompetitive nature of our setting (D'Aveni, 1994; Hoisl et al., 2017), we take into account the role 
of firms’ prior technological knowledge, and thus control for the influence prior experience (King and Tucci, 
2002), which we specifically classify as general knowledge or specialised knowledge (Balconi, 2002; Grant, 
1996; Hamel, 1991)—depending on its proximity to the actual field of application. Embracing a longitudinal 
view in regulatory settings (as recommended by Blind, 2012) also allows us to carefully reflect on the value 
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of prior technological assets (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) within specific technological trajectories (Dosi, 
1982; Jenkins and Floyd, 2001). 
By following rigorous protocols of qualitative analysis, we develop a comparative, multiple case study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2008) on the technological innovation strategies adopted by car constructors 
participating the Le Mans Prototype 1 (LMP1) racing series—which is part of the FIA World Endurance 
Championship (WEC) —in response to regulatory changes throughout the period 2012-15. Since 1923 and 
the first race of the iconic ‘24 hours of Le Mans’, endurance racing has become one of the leading and most 
technologically advanced motorsport events, and we identify and discuss several reasons that make LMP1 an 
ideal setting to respond to our research question. Among others, in year 2012 the FIA-ACO governing body 
introduced hybrid power units1 for the first time in WEC history. A careful investigation of car blueprints, 
technical commentaries and official regulation bulletins, together with in-depth interviews with experts, 
revealed that in the following four years all four possible combination of incremental vs. radical and 
restrictive vs. permissive changes were introduced—a unique occurrence, which makes this setting almost an 
ideal natural experiment for our study, and gives us the opportunity to pioneer the very first management 
study based on data from the iconic Le Mans Prototype racing. We track a precise and nuanced account of 
the firms’ competing technologies and race result; we identify not only the specific configurations associated 
with superior performance vis-à-vis different regulatory conditions, but also explanations of the conditions 
and mechanisms underpinning such outcomes. 
After reviewing the theory that informed our study, we will present our empirical setting, our research 
methods, and findings. Finally, we will identify and discuss a set of propositions representing the 
contributions for present and future research, and depict two overarching models. Limitations of the study 
and implications for theory and practice will be also addressed in the concluding section.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. Technological innovation as firm response to environmental change 
Organizational adaptation to changing environments and the firm’s responses—for example via 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991)—are traditional topics in studies investigating the role of 
                                                   
1 Hybrid systems allow an energy saving by powering a car with two different sources of energy: fuel and electricity. In 
the FIA-WEC, the electricity can be produced via the recovery of the kinetic energy created by braking or the heat 
produced by exhaust gases. See our “Appendix” for an illustration of the Hybrid System used by Porsche in 2014.  
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innovation (Benner and Tushman, 2002, 2003; He and Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 2006). According to 
Benner and Tushman (2002, p. 679) “exploitative innovations involve improvements in existing components 
and build on the existing technological trajectory, whereas exploratory innovation involves a shift to a 
different technological trajectory.” 2 In this paper, we will focus on the value of exploratory innovation in a 
technology-driven, hypercompetitive setting (Hoisl et al., 2017). While venturing into different technological 
trajectories (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Dosi, 1982), innovation efforts can be radical or incremental, 
depending on the magnitude of technological advance compared to the current technological standard in the 
industry (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Recently scholars affirmed that 
exploratory innovation brings curvilinear returns to performance, and that beyond a specific optimum such 
returns might actually become negative (Gupta et al., 2006).  
Striking such optimum is particularly complex during environmental shifts, which makes the 
performance-maximizing point a “moving target” (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). While some studies highlight 
the positive outcomes of increasing exploration when environmental change occurs (Geroski, 1995; Jansen et 
al., 2006) others rather focus on the pitfalls, and warn that, beyond a certain point, environmental change 
might erode the rewards of exploratory efforts, thus rapidly turning performance returns flat or even negative 
(Marino et al., 2015; Posen and Levinthal, 2012; Zhou and Wu, 2010). If fostering exploration can help 
adapt to environmental changes (Blundell et al., 1999; Levinthal, 1997; Teece et al., 1997), it may also 
increase costs and risks, thus significantly reducing the likelihood of enjoying its potential benefits. Research 
has only recently started inquiring on the reason of such diverging positions, and there is common agreement 
that advancing a consistent and nuanced understanding of such complex phenomenon is a challenging task, 
which requires a careful dissection of its main intervening factors. Particularly in technological setting, 
scholars have advised to critically consider the firm’s prior investments, activities, and learning experiences, 
whose general and specialised knowledge can be more or less complementary to the current firm’s 
innovation task (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996; King and Tucci, 2002; Tallman et al., 2004). 
Further, the value of innovation might depend on its fit within the technological trajectory the firm is 
pursuing (Dosi, 1982; Jenkins and Floyd, 2001). Technological trajectories are defined as a series of path 
                                                   
2 By joining studies envisioning exploration and exploitation as orthogonal, independent forces (Gupta et al., 2006: 697) 
this paper follows recent studies (Marino et al., 2015) in assessing the net value of exploration on performance by 
specifically investigating an empirical setting where exploitation plays a negligible role on performance.  
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dependent experiences that track the evolution of a technology (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Reasoning on 
technological trajectories thus requires mentioning an important caveat: environments where the competition 
is fiercer will usually display higher rates of firm innovation, which will reduce the average life-span of each 
solution, and thus create further incentives for firms to shift towards more promising technological 
trajectories. Simply put, the obsolescence rate of technologies is often exacerbated by competition, and this 
might reduce the incumbents’ advantage and their product life-cycle (Suarez and Lanzolla, 2005, 2007). This 
also explains why scholars have traditionally favoured so-called “hypercompetitive settings” to investigate 
the dynamics connecting environmental change to firm innovation and performance (D'Aveni, 1994; Hoisl et 
al., 2017; Volberda, 1996). In fast-paced competition, in fact, the interplay between firm innovation and the 
environment is usually tighter, more visible, and it develops in shorter time-spans. Yet, even in 
hypercompetitive settings, environmental change remains per se a complex construct to investigate 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989b; McCarthy et al., 2010), which calls for a meticulous 
and fine-grained approach. 
2.2 Understanding regulations and their dimensions within environmental change 
To fully understand the reason of different and sometimes diverging results on the relation between 
exploratory innovation and performance under shifting contingencies, scholars have been advised to 
carefully consider the faceted nature of environmental change (McCarthy et al., 2010). Along these lines, in 
1988 Bourgeois and Eisenhardt introduced the pivotal concept of environmental velocity. A high velocity 
environment is described as a setting with “rapid and discontinuous change in demand, competitors, 
technology and/or regulation” (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988, p. 816). Building on Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt (1988), more recent studies conceptualized environmental change as “multidimensional” 
(McCarthy et al., 2010, p. 604) and argued that velocity holds paramount implications for a firm’s strategy 
and performance. To understand such relation scholars must appreciate the different nature and dimensions 
of environmental change. 
Indeed, literature shows that sources of environmental change can have different origins. These 
environmental dimensions are linked in non-trivial ways, and their mutual interdependence is—more often 
than not—difficult to assess (Garud et al., 2013). For example, in recent years the availability of greener 
technologies for the car industry allowed policy makers to release and enforce regulations that further pushed 
firms’ research and development efforts for engine efficiency and low emission. This nurtured mixed effects 
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on competition. In fact, on the one hand regulatory changes created market opportunities for newcomers 
such as Tesla, but on the other they also motivated incumbents to pioneer innovative solutions such as hybrid 
and electrical engines (see for example the BMW i3 and i8 series in the high-end market or Nissan Leaf in 
the low-end). Rising pressure to cope with increasingly environmentally-conscious markets (i.e., consumers 
and regulations) also were one of the factors inducing the adoption of illegal technological solutions at 
Volkswagen, which were unveiled in the recent emission scandal and ultimately motivated the regulators to 
further exacerbate controls and constraints in the industry (Spicer, 2015).  
In technology-driven competition, regulations represent one of the major sources of environmental 
change and they directly influence firms’ strategic orientation and innovation (Mahon and Murray, 1981; 
Ramaswamy et al., 1994; Reger et al., 1992). Yet, scholars lament that “regulation, innovation and 
competitiveness in global markets have been discussed for several decades. However, little progress has been 
made to understand the effect of regulation on the ability of industries to innovate” (Blind, 2012, p. 391). 
Regulations are a velocity dimension that measure “the nature and the scope of the control provided by new 
laws and regulation in a given period” (McCarthy et al., 2010, p. 609). Regulatory changes—similarly to 
other types of environmental change—may also vary across multiple dimensions, thus making shifting 
scenarios harder to interpret unless one adopts a precise classification of change.  
 As pointed out by recent contributions (Marino et al., 2015; McCarthy et al., 2010) scholars 
traditionally distinguish between two main dimensions of environmental change: the frequency (e.g., Child, 
1972; Wholey and Brittain, 1989) and the magnitude of the change (e.g., Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Tushman and Anderson, 1986). The former corresponds to the amount of time between subsequent changes, 
while the latter defines the degree of difference between states at subsequent points in time. The magnitude 
of change is traditionally codified either as incremental or radical (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). Incremental changes are “competence-enhancing”, meaning that they aim to improve and 
advance the firms’ existing set of knowledge, competences, and technologies. Radical changes instead are 
“competence destroying”, meaning that they establish a new set of knowledge, competences, and 
technologies which substitute the existing firms’ assets and capabilities (Tushman and Anderson, 1986, p. 
442). For this reason, radical shifts can trigger disruptive changes (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Christensen, 
1997) and lead to new technological standards and industry paradigms (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; 
Spender, 1989), which in certain cases might destabilize the market’s status quo and favour new entrants 
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(Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Porter, 1980; Suarez and Lanzolla, 2007). An 
industry could for example have a high or low rate of new regulations—e.g., depending on how often new 
rules are released or replaced; see Reger et al. (1992), and can involve either incremental or radical 
regulations—e.g., depending on whether they aim at refining the application of an existing technology or to 
completely substitute it with a new one; see Marino et al. (2015). Further, such changes can be more or less 
predictable—which affects the firm’s ability to absorb increasing magnitudes and frequencies; see Ungson et 
al. (1985). Frequency, magnitude and predictability are important dimensions to understand environmental 
change (see Table 1 for an essential literature review), but—particularly in the case of regulations—they fail 
to capture another critical aspect, which is what we term here as the direction of regulation change, or in 
simple words, whether the rules become more restrictive or permissive (see discussion in Reger et al., 1992, 
p. 191). From the regulators’ perspective, regulations are in most cases restrictive in nature, as they usually 
aim to control and reduce the competitors’ degrees of freedom within a specific arena—supposedly with the 
intent to promote free competition and public welfare (Blind, 2012). This usually correspond to banning 
specific technologies or solutions, or limiting their adoption (Mahon and Murray, 1981; Reger et al., 1992). 
Yet, in cases where regulations move in the opposite direction, scholars and practitioners use the term 
“deregulation” (Reger et al., 1992) to identify, for example, more permissive “policies measures such as a 
relaxation in sectoral restrictions on technology imports, substantial tax cuts on royalties and technical fees, 
simplification of tax structure” (Aggarwal, 2000, p. 1082). Accordingly, to theoretically and empirically 
distinguish the two domains, we adopt the dichotomy restrictive regulations vs. permissive regulations to 
identify changes in the regulation body aimed at reducing rather than increasing the degrees of freedom in 
firms’ technological exploration (for a review on different regulatory classifications see Blind, 2012).3 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Understanding the nature of regulations also requires a reflection on their objectives and outcomes. In 
line with prior contributions (Blind, 2012; Blind et al., 2017; Reger et al., 1992) we observe that the initial 
                                                   
3 We prefer to use the term ‘permissive regulation’ instead of simply ‘deregulation’ as the latter usually implies the 
presence of prior regulatory constraints (Reger et al., 1992). Our setting, however, presents a slightly different 
connotation, as the regulatory action initially operated in a vacatio legis (i.e., absence of rules on a specific matter), 
where the regulator decided to provide some general indications to create a new market for a novel product category 
(i.e., a new technological standard for a new racing series). Yet, such indications were originally designed to create a 
deregulated competitive space (Mahon and Murray, 1981)—a condition which is traditionally aimed to attract new 
entrants and foster incumbents’ innovation (Blind et al., 2017; Porter, 1980). 
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intention of the regulator might effectively trigger diverging behaviours among the rule recipients—might 
these be individuals, organizations or countries. Despite several scholarly attempts, Blind (2012, p. 395) 
highlights that “especially the quantitative studies are not able to distinguish between the influence of 
changes in the legislation and their enforcement or the compliance of companies on innovation activities”. 
This reflection leads to at least two important implications for our research endeavour. First, we 
acknowledge that a qualitative, population-level perspective is perhaps more suitable to capture the nuances 
of firm behaviours. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we purposefully adopt the regulators’ perspective 
and classify regulations in line with the initial objectives that the regulator envisioned, independently from 
the effects they trigger at the firm level. This means that, for example, we define as “restrictive” a set of rules 
that the regulator defined as aimed at reducing the competitors’ technological options; and “permissive” 
those originally promoting free experimentation with multiple solutions (Reger et al., 1992). By doing so, we 
do not exclude the possibility that even restrictive frameworks might nonetheless offer firms the opportunity 
to ‘work around the rules’, thus fostering innovations that somehow cannot be openly banned by the 
governing body.  
2.3. The relation between regulations and firm outcomes 
With few exceptions, literature connecting regulatory changes to firm-level outcomes is still scarce 
(Blind, 2012, p. 395), and mostly skewed towards studies exploring the effect of regulation as a policy to 
foster firm innovation—mostly for negative externality reduction or environmental preservation (e.g., Jaffe 
and Palmer, 1997; Palmer et al., 1995; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). In addition, the literature presents 
“great controversy” as the scholar’s positions cluster across two diverging points of view (Blind et al., 2017, 
p. 249). On the one side, scholars highlight how regulations “restrict firms in their innovation activities” as 
regulation compliance expenditure are directly correlated to research and development expenses (Jaffe and 
Palmer, 1997). Also, regulations primarily affect the product development and are ‘technology-forcing’, in a 
sense that by using different types of restrictions, regulations can channel the industry players to abandon 
some technologies in favour of others (Ashford et al., 1985; La Pierre, 1976). Within this perspective, 
scholars thus advocate that deregulation can promote “complementarity between technology imports and 
R&D efforts significantly” as well as “product differentiation, demand conditions and technology-related 
factors” (Aggarwal, 2000, p. 1081). 
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Yet, several scholars embrace the opposite point of view and agree that regulations—if properly 
designed—can stimulate firms to increase their innovation efforts (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) and 
observe that even when regulations make compliance costs surge, the patenting of new technologies also 
raises within a short time (Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). Regulations, as all other dimensions of environmental 
change, trigger adaptive responses at the firm level (Mahon and Murray, 1981), and therefore scholars affirm 
that regulations—might they be permissive or restrictive—do not necessarily straitjacket innovation (Jaffe 
and Palmer, 1997; Marino et al., 2015; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Smith and Grimm, 1987; Young, 
2002). For this reason, expert scholars have recently declared that, particularly in technological settings, 
“regulations are challenges which provide opportunities to be more creative” (Jenkins, 2014a).4 
What is less clear—and largely underexplored—is how different regulatory directions affect the relation 
between firm innovation and performance (for an exception see Smith and Grimm, 1987). In other words, 
one could imagine that different types of firm responses (e.g., radical vs. incremental innovation; related to 
core vs. peripheral subsystems) might better fit regulation changes that are either restrictive or permissive in 
nature, and thus lead to superior performance outcomes. A recent study examined the relationship between 
firm exploration efforts and performance under regulatory changes of different magnitude, and suggested 
that when the regulations undergo radical changes, firms’ incremental explorations such as “imitation and 
reverse engineering of technologies, may be the best approaches” (Marino et al., 2015, p. 1095). On the 
contrary, when regulation change moderately, or do not change at all, firms that pursue radical explorations 
will maximize their performance. However, this case does not inform us about the different directions of 
change, and particularly it is agnostic on the moderating effect of deregulations or permissive regulations, 
thus leaving our understanding incomplete. Smith and Grimm (1987, p. 373), for example, show that when a 
major deregulation is established, a strategic change from an “unfocused follower strategy to an innovation 
strategy” seems to be the most profitable option. This suggests that the direction of change (e.g., from 
restrictive to permissive) might revert the expected prediction a mere account of a change in magnitude 
would entail. And yet, there is almost no research inquiring on what kind of firm innovation maximizes 
performance under regulation changes that vary between permissive or restrictive. Scholars have only started 
to scratch the surface of an issue that, given the increasing regulatory actions in most industries, holds 
                                                   
4 Notably, Jenkins (2014a) specifically identifies similar dynamics both in motorsport settings (i.e., Formula 1) and 
more traditional industries. 
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promises to provide important contributions for theory and practice (Blind et al., 2004). To respond to this 
timely issue, we selected a setting whose characteristics uniquely allows us to dig deep into the nuanced 
interplay between regulatory change, firm technological innovation and performance: The Le Mans 
Prototype 1 category (LMP1) within the World Endurance Racing (WEC) series, better known for the iconic 
race called ‘The 24 Hours of Le Mans’.  
3. METHOD 
Our qualitative investigation is based on a longitudinal (2012-2015) comparative case study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2008) of the exploratory innovations adopted by the three car manufacturers (i.e., 
Audi, Toyota and Porsche) participating to the FIA WEC championship (racing class Le Mans Prototype 1, 
often shortened as LMP1) in response to environmental change of varying magnitude and direction (but 
constant temporal frequency and predictability). The study analyses a total of ten firm-year cases. We 
identified a setting that is small enough to observe the entire population of firms in great detail. By 
leveraging the rich and nuanced data from our setting, and by building several comparative tables (as 
recommended by Eisenhardt, 1989a) where variables and measures are coded through categories that are 
common in the field (Gioia et al., 2012), we qualitatively identified meaningful association between firm’s 
technological strategies and their performance under different regulatory contingencies, and ultimately tried 
to suggest dynamic patterns that explain the underlying mechanisms of such associations.  
3.1 Research setting 
Recently, scholars have increasingly leveraged empirical settings from different racing series to advance 
management research such as NASCAR (Bothner et al., 2007; Bothner et al., 2012) and Formula 1 (Aversa 
et al., 2018; Aversa et al., 2015; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Castellucci and Podolny, 2017; Hoisl et al., 
2016; Jenkins, 2010; Marino et al., 2015; Piezunka et al., 2018). In this work, we decided to explore 
dynamics in another high-tech racing setting called the FIA World Endurance Championship (WEC). With 
the prestigious 24 hours of Le Mans as flagship (established in 1923) this series—which is run by the 
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) and by the Automobile Club de l’Ouest (ACO)—currently 
includes four different categories of competition and is composed of nine races that take place around the 
world. In this study, we focus on the most recent and technology-advanced category called Le Mans 
Prototype 1 (LMP1). This competition is open only to major car manufacturers, which must race with their 
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own prototype cars. This allows us to observe the efforts of major car makers engaging with the perils of 
developing a futuristic vehicle that pioneers some of the latest discoveries in automotive—a motorsport 
phenomenon that mimics the broader introduction of hybrid and electric vehicles in the main automobile 
market (Sierzchula et al., 2012). When LMP1 cars are powered by a combination of traditional combustion 
engine and electrical energy recovery systems (ERS), the sub-series is also called ‘LMP1 Hybrid or LMP1-
H’. Also, we bracketed our analysis on the period between 2012 and 2015, which displayed unique 
conditions to support our research endeavour. Indeed, two radical changes of regulations occurred during this 
period (i.e., in 2012 and in 2014) and three constructor teams (i.e., Audi, Toyota and Porsche) competed 
against each other by using three different hybrid systems and three different innovation strategies.5 Also, in 
these racing seasons we can interestingly observe the dynamics connected to two new entrants: Toyota and 
Porsche. This situation makes the competition an ideally simplified setting with enough variance to respond 
to our research questions, but small enough to qualitative unveil the granularity of the underlying 
mechanisms connecting regulatory changes to firm technological innovation and performance.  
As other racing series, the LMP1 championship presents different qualities that makes it a “perfect 
laboratory for research” (Gino and Pisano, 2011, p. 70). We describe here the advantages of our setting, 
while limitations will be carefully addressed in the concluding paragraph. First, by not only being a 
technology-based, but also a highly regulated setting, it presents similar traits to more common industries 
such as automotive (Lee et al., 2011; Narayanan, 1998), chemicals (Hartnell, 1996), pharmaceuticals 
(Morris, 2000) and railways (Smith and Grimm, 1987). Therefore, it allows—to some degree and within 
some boundary conditions—to generalize our findings and strengthen the external validity of our study. 
Second, firms competing in the LMP1 are not only comparable in size (i.e., all racing teams are owned by 
major car manufacturers), organizational structure, team roles and objectives, but also similar in the type of 
products they develop: as they all are completely and exclusively focused on the yearly production of a high-
tech car prototype, they can be effectively considered single-product organizations. This means that spurious 
effects related to product and technology diversification are less of a concern in this setting. Also, in all 
LMP1 teams learning curves for process innovations, economies of scale, and efficiency-based objectives do 
not significantly influence the performance outcome, thus reducing concerns for an array of common 
                                                   
5 During the 2012 season, Audi also run two cars without hybrid systems called Audi R18 Ultra. For this reason, we 
have excluded those cars from our observed sample.  
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confounding effects that could hardly be controlled in a qualitative study. Third, giving the duration of 
endurance races (up to 24h), the WEC is a discipline where reliability and consistency matter more than 
mere top speed, thus representing an ideal ground testing for product performance under extreme 
circumstances. Fourth, all firms race simultaneously and in the same location so they have to adapt to the 
same exogenous conditions such as weather and racetrack characteristics—as well as regulations, of course. 
Fifth, the popularity of such competition allowed us to access a wide and fine-grained amount of public, high 
quality, official data covering several aspects of the regulations, the car technology and the results. Such 
archival data also include several interviews with experts and top professionals that were collected directly at 
the races or immediately after; this reduces concerns for retrospective call biases in comparison to traditional 
ex-post interviews. Last but not least, racing naturally offers precise metrics on regulations and product 
performance (Aversa and Berinato, 2017; Hoisl et al., 2017; Jenkins et al., 2016; Marino et al., 2015). 
3.2 Data  
Our research is based on a collection of official archival and primary data (i.e., interviews). In line with 
former qualitative research in motorsport (e.g., see among others Aversa et al., 2015; Jenkins, 2014b) the 
archival document collection was developed through a broad range of different sources such as books, 
official FIA and ACO releases, official documents from the manufacturers, generalist and specialised press 
and technical blogs (see Table 2 for a precise account of the data sources). Altogether, we collected more 
than 1,100 pages of archival data.  
The use of multi-source, public, official data allowed us to extensively triangulate individual 
informants’ cognitive biases and retrospective sense-making. We firstly inspected all official FIA-ACO 
regulations bulletins between 2012 and 2015 with the intent to track every regulation change. We also 
studied prior documents that prepared to the introduction of such changes (e.g., meeting reports where the 
change was discussed, interviews with key decision makers, official proposals, etc.). Then, we looked at the 
specialised press and blogs to gain insights into each car’s development before and during each season of our 
observation period. We mostly focused on the firms’ innovation regarding the different components of each 
LMP1 car, the yearly regulatory changes and the teams’ performance. Our initial body of documents was 
skimmed based on relevance, reliability of the information and the source, repetition (several websites tend 
to re-post the same information), which ultimately led to a compound, refined selection of 110 documents for 
a total of 221 single-space pages of relevant text.  
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Despite this study is mostly based on secondary archival data (which often report extensive interviews 
to the most important executives and experts in the field), we also directly ran several interviews with 
industry informants and professionals to gain specific understanding of the relation between the variables, 
and ultimately to verify our interpretations. The experts were selected based on their acclaimed experience in 
the field, and all of them extensively worked in LMP1, WEC or motorsport. The interviewees included team 
executives, journalists, opinion leaders, engineers and members of the governing body—see Table 3 for 
details on our informants and interviews from primary data. However, thanks to secondary archival data, we 
additionally reviewed 63 useful interviews whose topic was significantly related to our inquiry. The 
interviews conducted in French were translated by scholars who are bilingual and cross-checked with 
external data. Controversial interpretations about the translation have been jointly discussed until reaching 
agreement, or discarded when this was not achieved.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
3.3 Coding and analysis 
We conducted a structured coding process to classify qualitative evidence as discrete variables both at 
the firm (i.e., innovations) and the environment (i.e., regulation) level (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Then, by 
associating our codes to racing performance measures, we identified a series of theory-informing patterns 
that link firm exploratory innovation to performance within different regulatory contingencies. 
Knowledgeable experts’ opinions were incredibly useful in identifying the underlying processes and 
mechanisms in this interplay, and some of their most significant quotes are reported in our analyses. Finally, 
in line with common protocols for qualitative analysis, one of the scholars played the “devil’s advocate” 
(Gioia et al., 2012, p. 19) and challenged the weaker interpretations, discarding those that were not 
sufficiently supported by evidence or shared understanding.  
3.3.1 Environmental level variables 
At the environmental level, we followed the method used by previous research that were also studying 
regulation change in motorsport such as Marino et al. (2015). Given the impossibility to fully distinguish the 
aim of the regulator from the specific firm’s interpretation and compliance (see discussion in Blind, 2012, p. 
395) we aligned to traditional procedures and classified the rules based on the regulators’ original aim.  We 
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chose the magnitude of the regulation changes by coding the variations in the FIA-ACO technical 
regulations. We noted competence-destroying changes in the regulations as radical, and competence-
enhancing changes in the regulations as incremental. Furthermore, we coded regulation dynamism based on 
the direction of change (Reger et al., 1992), either permissive when regulators aimed to give more freedom to 
the teams in terms of technological development and when effectively deregulating a specific domain; or 
restrictive when regulators released frameworks that were aimed to reduce the teams’ freedom or increase 
controls and ceilings on the technological development. Table 4 offers a precise account of our rule coding. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
3.3.2 Firm level variables 
 At the firm level, we examined and associated performance outcomes to technical articles and official 
blueprints6 concerning the design and engineering of the entire population of cars competing in the LMP1 
between 2012 and 2015 (10 cars in total, 2 vehicles in 2012-2013 and 3 competing in 2014-15 respectively) 
and we used four different groups of variables in order to give us insights into: (1)  The racing teams’ 
performance (final championship tally related total number of points as per Jenkins, 2010, 2014b); (2) The 
type of subsystem involved (core subsystem vs. peripheral subsystem; as per Murmann and Frenken, 2006); 
(3) The magnitude of the change (incremental vs. radical; as per Henderson and Clark, 1990) (4) The firms’ 
prior technical knowledge in the form of general vs. specific knowledge (Grant, 1996; Tallman et al., 2004), 
and whether this related to core or peripheral subsystems. Simply put, we coded ‘how well’ the team did in 
the racing, ‘what’ technology was changing, ‘how radical’ the innovation was, plus ‘what prior knowledge’ 
informed the process.  
Firm performance. To measure each firm performance record and in line with previous research related 
to Formula 1 (see Aversa et al., 2015; Jenkins, 2010; 2014b among others), we used the official FIA-ACO 
rankings from the yearly Constructor Championship. 
Subsystems involved. In line with former studies about complexity of system architecture (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000; Brusoni et al., 2001; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Murmann and Frenken, 2006; Simon, 1962; 
                                                   
6 Differently from other technology-intensive series, prototype racing almost never relies on patenting, but rather on 
industrial secrets. In fact, patents would reveal important information to rivals, thus favouring imitation and putting a 
firm’s competitive advantage at risk. Further, the intense pace of the yearly tournament does not leave enough time to 
undergo patenting protocols. For these reasons, all works based on similar settings to LMP1 (e.g., Formula 1) have 
never relied on patent analysis, but on codification of technical blueprints, which often become publicly available when 
the championship ends. 
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Simon, 2002), we conceptualized cars as a complex systems “that evolve in a form of a nested hierarchy of 
technology cycles” (Murmann and Frenken, 2006, p. 931) thus allowing a longitudinal analysis across 
multiple hierarchical subsystems of a product architecture. By understanding the hierarchical structure of a 
car (for similar applications see Cabigiosu et al., 2012; Marino et al., 2015), we identified that a racing car 
was made by integrating different ‘core’ subsystems such as chassis, powertrain and aerodynamics, and 
‘peripheral’ subsystems such as ERS, brakes and wheels. This classification was based on the Murmann and 
Frenken’s concept of “pleiotropy” (2006, p. 925) and it is aimed at identifying at which hierarchical level 
innovation was taking place, and it is based on principles related to the system’s centrality in the overall 
product design, its importance for performance upgrades, and the complexity, costs and risks in replacement 
or retrofit (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Murmann and Frenken, 2006; Soda and Furlotti, 2014). Core 
subsystems (i.e., technological components) connect multiple others and embed more knowledge, so they are 
more impactful on the performance of the broad system, though they are complex, more tightly integrated in 
the product architecture, and demand major development and substitution costs. In turn, peripheral parts are 
less complex, less tightly integrated in the product architecture, and impactful on performance, but need 
notably less effort to build or substitute (i.e., low risk/low gain; Tushman and Murmann, 1998).7 
Magnitude of change. To track the magnitude of change we used a very common dichotomy by 
Henderson and Clark (1990) distinguishing between radical vs. incremental innovations and we applied in 
relation to whether the innovation was new to LMP1 or not—for a similar operationalization in motorsport 
see Marino et al. (2015). Specifically, we coded changes at the firm level as radical when it was the first time 
a technological solution was used in LMP1 (i.e., new to the field, coming from F1 or more broadly from 
automotive) and thus required the organization to undergo a significant resource or capability upgrade; these 
technologies were often disruptive in relation to prior technological standards. In contrast, we coded changes 
as incremental when the technological solution was only a progressive enhancement of a system previously 
in use in endurance motorsport racing.8  
                                                   
7 In line with Murmann and Frenken (2006, p. 941) “we call high-pleiotropy components core components 
and low-pleiotropy components peripheral components, because changes in high-pleiotropy components have 
greater repercussions for the functioning of the system as a whole than do changes in peripheral components. 
The most important insight, which also is true for the structure of biological evolution, is that once a design 
has settled on particular variants of core components, further advances are concentrated in peripheral components 
only”. 
8 LMP1 (similarly to Formula 1) is a hypercompetitive setting (Hoisl et al., 2017) as cars are not only among the fastest 
ever built, but they have to race without stopping up to 24 hours. Technology in LMP1 is at the very ultimate forefront 
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General vs. specialised knowledge. We collected each firm’s prior knowledge and experiences, as this 
might affect the firm’s capability to value, assimilate, and apply new knowledge, for example as an 
innovation response to a regulatory shift. Specifically, we follow prior contributions (Balconi, 2002; Grant, 
1996) in classifying general knowledge as the firm’s set of knowledge and technological experiences related 
to more distant fields of application that can nonetheless broadly inform the innovation process in the focal 
domain. We classify instead as specialised knowledge the part of knowledge and experiences that derive 
from the direct and specific application to the focal domain. Take as an example major automotive 
manufacturers such as Toyota, Audi and Porsche. Their engagement with hybrid technologies for standard 
road-cars (e.g., lithium-ion batteries or flywheels) provides a general basis for a broad understanding of the 
main challenges that an application to LMP1 entails—and thus is coded as general knowledge. Yet, given the 
hyper-advanced nature of LMP1 technology, only a specific and recent application of such devices to LMP1 
might provide sufficient understanding to fully engage with contingent technological innovation—which we 
code as specialised knowledge. By going back to the roots of each firm’s technological know-how, we can 
also track the different technological trajectories (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Dosi, 1982; Jenkins and Floyd, 
2001) each firm is pursuing (i.e., flywheel vs. supercapacitor vs. lithium-ion battery), and take into account 
firms’ shifts towards new solutions, as well as their constraints and core-rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Table 5 offers a tabulation associating the codification of firm level changes to environmental changes. 
Each car’s individual blueprints codification is available in the supplemental materials for review, as well as 
a precise tabulation on the origins of each firms’ prior knowledge. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
3.4 Additional materials for review 
To provide a transparent and more informed account of our analyses, we prepared a complete set of 
additional materials (i.e., qualitative insights and descriptive statistics), which complement the essential 
exhibits in this manuscript and offer additional nuance to readers who might not be familiar with LMP1 or 
                                                   
of the automotive sector. For this reason, prior knowledge in road-car, minor racing categories, or even F1 (when dated 
more than two or three years), might have little or no application and value in current LMP1. Several cases of failure 
offer face-validity to such statement: among others, Honda disastrous comeback to F1 as McLaren engine supplier 
(2015-2017) proved the company unable to reach the necessary technological edge despite being the biggest engine 
producer in the world, a major manufacturer of hybrid technologies, and having successfully competed in F1 until 2009, 
both as engine manufacturer and constructor (Noble, 2017). Similarly, the underperforming cases of Toyota, Jaguar and 
BMW in Formula 1 further corroborate this argument—see also our discussion point in the conclusion. 
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motorsport in general. Appendix A includes a glossary of technical terms used in the paper (Table A1); a 
tabulation comparing the detailed qualitative codification of all technological innovation at the firm level 
between 2012 and 2015 (Table A2); a detailed account of each team’s general knowledge (from other series 
and road cars) and specialised knowledge (from LMP1), divided across four subsystems—two core and two 
peripheral (Tables A3a, A3b, A3c); tables with race results between 2012 and 2015 (Table A4); a 
comparison of main races’ features (Table A5); a detailed account of the yearly firms’ final ranking in LMP1 
championship (Table A6); a visual comparison of competing technologies developed by the firms (Table 
A7). Appendix B presents three mini case studies on Audi, Toyota and Porsche, which inform about their 
past experience in motorsport and endurance racing. 
4. LMP1 FIRM TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSES UNDER REGULATORY SHIFTS (2012-2015) 
 [Insert Table 4 and 5 about here] 
LMP1 racing seasons between 2012 and 2015 represent a unique and ideal setting for our research due 
to the type and sequence of regulation changes, as well as their effect on the competition. During these four 
years, a new, disruptive technology was introduced in the field: an energy recovery system (ERS) that 
transformed traditional combustion engines into hybrid power units. During this period, two different cycles 
of environmental changes took place: first, a cycle characterized by permissive regulations (2012-2013), 
started in a radical magnitude (2012) and followed by a more incremental magnitude (2013). FIA-ACO’s 
regulations in these two years were aimed at opening avenues for new technological experimentation, and for 
this reason they were purposefully permissive. In contrast, the second cycle (2014-15) was aimed at 
controlling and harnessing such experimentation toward few, consistent and useful solutions, thus making 
the regulations more restrictive, first in a radical magnitude (2014) and later in an incremental magnitude 
(2015). For each of the cycle we will analyse the empirical evidence and consequently advance two 
propositions (and related corollaries under polar regulatory conditions)—i.e., p1 and p2 for permissive 
regulations; corollary to p1 and p2 for restrictive regulations. 
4.1.1 2012-13: Permissive regulations for a new technological paradigm 
After years of hesitation and negotiations, in 2012 the FIA and the ACO decided to jointly establish a 
new championship for endurance car racing (i.e., WEC). The idea behind this new series was to attract the 
major road car manufacturers to endurance racing. This in turn would have enhanced the sport visibility and 
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fostered public utility by pioneering solutions that could be later adopted in standard road cars (Goodwin, 
2012). The new WEC series revolved around the introduction of a new hybrid systems, as the former ACO’s 
Technical Director confirmed during an interview:  
“We aimed to create room for them (i.e., the car manufacturers) to develop new technologies that could 
be commercialized on their road cars later on. The issue was to figure out a way to regulate this new 
technology while keeping it a competitive championship.” [Daniel Perdrix, Former ACO’s Technical 
Director; Source: Interview]. 
The new 2012 WEC regulations added for the first time a technical framework to ‘upgrade’ the 
prototype category (i.e., LMP1) to the use of hybrid systems (i.e., LMP1-H). The new regulations radically 
changed the existing ones and started by giving freedom to the constructors regarding the technological 
development (i.e., flywheel; capacitors; different type of batteries).  
“We had established a quite high minimum weight for the prototypes (900kg) giving to the constructors 
room to develop a hybrid system following their own technical choices. (…) We did not want to close 
doors for innovative solutions as we wanted to promote research on new hybrid systems for road cars 
during a period where ‘the gallon’ was incredibly expensive and the automobile industry seen as a 
danger for the earth’s future.” [Daniel Perdrix, Former ACO Technical Director, 2016; Source: 
Interview].  
As shown in Table 4, the new rules not only defined a hybrid car in general, permissive terms—which 
left room for different interpretations—but also explicitly opened the category to different technical solutions 
regarding the ‘energy recovery system’ (ERS) (art. 1.13 and 1.14 FIA-ACO 2012 technical regulations, 
2012), which is fundamentally based on a technology that collects excess energy (i.e., heat) in the car—from 
the brakes, exhaust pipes and engine—transforms it into electrical energy and makes it available for 
additional acceleration (similar to what happens in Formula 1—see the KERS case in Marino et al., 2015, p. 
1090). Although the ERS was initially limited to releasing a total energy of 0.5 MJ9 (art. 1.13, 2012 FIA-
ACO technical regulations, 2012), it was fundamentally independent from the traditional engine, which 
allowed manufacturers to experiment the new system without affecting the traditional powertrain in the case 
of malfunctioning, failure or accident.10 Also, the regulations left the teams free to choose their own fuel tank 
and fuel flow design. Often described as a transition phase between two years of radical change, the 2013 
WEC season presented only minor changes both at the regulatory and firm innovation level (Source: 
                                                   
9 The megajoule (MJ) is equal to one million (106) joules, or approximately the kinetic energy of a one megagram 
(tonne) vehicle moving at 160 km/h. 
10 For example in 2012, Audi’s winning car at Le Mans race damaged its hybrid system few hours before the end of the 
competition without consequences on its diesel powertrain’s performance (Codling, 2012; Codling, 2013). 
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Endurance-Info.com, 2013). In line with 2012 changes, the technical regulations indeed remained permissive 
in terms of technological freedom and added only few incremental changes concerning the car safety (see 
table 3). Also, they advanced some specifications concerning rear extractors and diffusers dimensions (see 
table 3, art. 3.4.5 and 3.5.2, 2013 of technical regulations).  
4.1.2 Firm responses to radical, permissive regulatory changes (2012) 
Given the engineering freedom allowed by the rules, the two LMP1 competitors (i.e., newcomer Toyota 
and incumbent Audi) in 2012 chose two new but different solutions for their ERS. Table 5 codifies firm 
responses to the regulation change both for the peripheral subsystems (e.g., ERS, gearbox, brakes, etc.) and 
core subsystems (e.g., engine, chassis, aerodynamics, etc.).11 
In 2012 Audi equipped its R18 e-tron car model with a hybrid power unit combining an ERS to a TDI 
engine. It was the first time that a WEC racing car was using such a configuration with a flywheel system12  
instead of batteries as energy storage.13 The flywheel system had an advantage not only in offering simplicity 
and superior reliability (Collins, 2013a), but also in releasing the kinetic energy on the front axle making the 
car effectively a four-wheel drive—a ground-breaking innovation as racing cars usually release the 
traditional engine’s energy on rear wheels (Rügheimer, 2013).14 Audi uniquely coupled this ERS with the 
same TDI engine used in the 2011 season (Pruett, 2012) and embraced a F1-inspired light-weight, carbon-
fibre gearbox housing aimed to significantly reduce weight (Collins, 2013a). Audi’s 2012 chassis and 
aerodynamics featured solid but nonetheless incremental solutions to its product (Congrega, 2011). 
However, it is important to notice that in prior years (particularly in 2006 and 2011) Audi had embraced a 
progressive trajectory of radical architectural change, so that by the beginning of 2012 season its car design 
had reached good balance and reliability. Audi could thus match an innovative chassis (i.e., core 
subsystem)—whose technological glitches had already been solved (Collins, 2013a)—to a radically new 
hybrid power unit and 4-wheel transmission system (i.e., peripheral subsystem) developed specifically for 
                                                   
11 The detailed codification of the firms’ technologies is available in the Appendix, Table A2.  
12 A flywheel system stores the energy mechanically, as rotation energy, by the use of a rotor spinning at a very high 
speed (Source: Porsche, 2010)  
13 Audi ‘borrowed’ and adapted this technology from its sister company, Porsche (Meiners, 2012), that had used it for 
one of its hybrid racing cars in a less technologically advanced racing series (i.e., 911 GT3-R Hybrid in 2010). Porsche, 
in turn, had originally purchased this system from Williams Formula 1 team (English, 2010). 
14 Such solution was absolutely new in the racing world (Rügheimer, 2013); a similar architecture had been tested for 
standard road cars in 2011 by Peugeot with its “Hybrid 4 technology” (Hammond, 2012). 
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the 2012 season. Accordingly, we coded Audi’s car in 2012 as incremental at the core subsystems level and 
radical at the peripheral subsystems level. 
Unlike Audi—which had a more recent and successful experience in endurance racing15—the 
newcomer Toyota debuted in 2012 with a LMP1 project elaborated almost from scratch, and despite not 
massively innovative, it represented a major technological effort for the Japanese contender. Toyota could in 
part benefit from its Formula 1 experience (Kim, 2012) that was discontinued in 2009.16 The new Toyota 
LMP1 car named TS030 combined a traditional design such as a normally aspirated V8 petrol engine—
heavily re-worked version of their Toyota Super GT 3.4-litre V-8 used in Japanese racing series (Kim, 
2012)—with a hybrid ERS developed via a novel in-house concept of ‘supercapacitor’, a high-performing 
storage system based on electrostatics rather than chemical principles of batteries—the only major 
innovation for Toyota, and a promising solution for energy storage. Toyota had purposefully decided to 
forego batteries due to their capacity limitations. This was confirmed by interviews with Toyota executives: 
“(…) Compared to the battery technology of the time, the supercapacitor was able to store a much 
greater amount of recovered energy within a very short time (braking times of 1-3 seconds). This was 
the key factor in choosing super capacitor technology (…)” [Marketing manager, Toyota; Source: 
Interview].  
Despite, releasing more energy than Audi’s (Emme, 2012), Toyota’s ERC released energy only on the 
rear axle and only below 120 km/h as per the 2012 regulations (see table 3 art. 1.13, 2012 of technical 
regulations). If the supercapacitor was almost a new-to-the-world solution,17 the other elements of the TS030 
were largely established. The aerodynamics imitated and improved the Peugeot LMP1 cars (Wittemeier, 
2012), while bodywork and exhaust system were inspired by the recent Toyota’s experience in F1 (Racecar-
Engineering, 2012). The remaining parts were evolutions of solutions used by Toyota in other series (Kim, 
2012). Toyota thus released an incremental chassis, engine and aerodynamics (i.e., core subsystems) with a 
radical supercapacitor-based ERS (i.e., peripheral subsystem).  
4.1.3 Firm responses to incremental, permissive regulatory changes (2013) 
In 2013 both Audi and Toyota tried to refine and improve the reliability of their 2012 cars. Audi 
followed the 2012 trajectory by introducing two versions of the R18 e-tron model that were extremely 
                                                   
15 The last endurance program from Toyota had ended in 1999.  
16 Toyota participated in the F1 championship from 2002 to 2009 as a constructor team—see Appendix for more details. 
17 The super capacitor system was developed by Toyota since 2006 and experimented in minor competitions on a 
Toyota Supra in 2007 in Japan (Toyota-Global.com, 2016). 
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similar to the 2012 model, both in terms of engine, 4-wheel drive and aerodynamics (Collins, 2013a). 
Indeed, only few incremental changes in the peripheral subsystems could be observed in the Audi 2013 car, 
such as a new radiator allowing a reduction of the airflow pressure, and a new rear wing extensions in order 
to reduce drag (Collins, 2013a). The ERS system was the same of 2012 but with slightly increased capacity 
(Vijayenthiran, 2013). Toyota as well underwent incremental updates for its TS030 car by consistently 
following the technological trajectory of their promising but still not victorious first season in LMP1 
(Collins, 2013b; Mercier, 2013). The company tried to solve the reliability problems that had troubled the 
first car version. Toyota executives specifically talked about “incremental improvements”: 
“For this year we have achieved some incremental improvements while including some pre-testing of 
2014 technologies. We have polished up things like power and efficiency whilst also fine-tuning the 
powertrain to enhance reliability. Overall we are confident we again have a very competitive and 
reliable powertrain.” [Source: Hisatake Murata, Toyota Hybrid Project Leader (Collins, 2013b)]. 
The Toyota TS030 featured an improved chassis and monocoque package that tweaked the overall 
shape of the car while upgrading its performance (Toyota, 2013). Similarly, the engine also underwent minor 
updates from 2012 (Collins, 2013b). More discreet changes could also be observed with the component 
usage optimization that was pursued by removing the deactivated MGU in front of the car (Collins, 2013b). 
In 2012, Toyota had in fact tested two different options for the MGU’s position: one on the front axle and the 
other one on the rear. The latter being chosen, the team did not have time to change the car’s overall design 
and kept a non-activated MGU on the front axle. By removing such MGU, in 2013 Toyota saved weight and 
rearranged the chassis space by receding the driver position, which improved the overall weight distribution. 
Finally, the supercapacitor system was enhanced to 300ps (Source: Toyota, 2014). Yet, as Toyota’s technical 
director Pascal Vasselon explained, the TS030 model 2013 was just an optimization of the 2012 model, but 
displayed no major upgrades.  
“…This year’s car has to be an evolution of our initial concept. The obvious target is to fix all the little 
issues we have found during the last season. The very first one is the 2012 car, that being a laboratory 
car, was able to accept front and rear hybrid systems, so we have redesigned the monocoque to 
optimize it without the front motor (…) there has been no concept change, just refinement and 
optimization of the 2012 car.” [Pascal Vasselon, Toyota Racing Group Technical Director in Miller 
(2013)]. 
4.1.4 Effects on performance 2012-13 and propositions 
In 2012 Audi dominated the championship by winning 5 races out of 8, and by finishing almost every 
race on the podium. The car overall managed to offer a very high-performing ‘technological package’, 
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which—thanks also to prior developments—provided a solid and innovative platform to reliably nest the 
radical hybrid module.18 Toyota also tried to embrace a different but still radical modular change within a 
traditional car architecture. Yet, despite three victories the team suffered several reliability issues, which 
undermined its chances for the championship.  
As permissive regulations offered little or no limitations to experimentation, it became harder for racing 
firms to identify the ‘performance ceilings’ and structural boundaries that each technology entailed. In other 
words, causal ambiguity (Powell et al., 2006; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) increased between different 
technological options and performance outcomes as team were uncertain on which specific solution (i.e., 
flywheel, supercapacitor, battery, etc.) was systematically superior. This ultimately reduced the firms’ 
incentives for shifts towards new technological trajectories, and by focusing on progressive optimizations, 
both Audi and Toyota continued their trajectories in 2012 and 2013, but in the second year the performance 
gap between the two rivals further diverged: Audi obtained the constructor championship by winning 6 races 
over 8, while Toyota won only the remaining 2. Accordingly, we suggest: 
Proposition 1. Permissive regulations increase technological uncertainty in the form of causal 
ambiguity between technological solutions and performance outcomes.  
Proposition 1a. Technological uncertainty reduces firms’ tendency to shift their technological 
trajectory.  
Field evidence helped us interpret the reasons behind the teams’ performance in these first two years. At 
the environmental level, permissive regulatory changes initially provided the conditions to explore diverse 
technological options. Field quotes strongly confirm this was the regulators’ original intention: 
“Every element of the regulations is permissive (…) they can do what they want regarding the 
technological development of their car from the hybrid system to the engine. (…) We wanted from the 
constructors to present us different technological possibilities.” [Vincent Beaumesnil, ACO Technical 
Director, 2017. Source: Interview].  
Such conditions increased technological differentiation between competitors—in our case while Audi 
focused on the flywheel, Toyota relied on a supercapacitor, two very different technologies with different 
functioning and performance returns. The radical nature of the regulatory change is expected to favour firms 
                                                   
18 Audi also run two “R18 ultra” without hybrid system. Since we focus on the adoption of a new technology (i.e., the 
hybrid system), we have not considered in the analysis competitors and vehicles displaying only the traditional engine. 
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with longer and broad technological experience (Eggers, 2012a; Eggers, 2012b)—as prior learning should in 
general support firm adaptation in changing environments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994; Levinthal and 
March, 1981). In these regards, both Toyota and Audi could leverage an extensive and successful 
technological background—thus allowing us to claim high levels of prior general knowledge for both 
organizations (developed in standard automotive and other racing series). Yet, it is noticeable that the two 
contenders were different in terms of general vs. specialised knowledge across their core and peripheral 
subsystems. Toyota could enjoy general knowledge both at the core and peripheral subsystem level, while 
Audi was mainly focused only on peripheral subsystems (see Table 3). However, Audi strong experience in 
LMP1 offered higher levels of specialised knowledge, particularly for the core components. 
“I agree to say the experience is very important in endurance. In 2012, Audi had more than a decade of 
experience and developed the diesel technology in 2014” [Vincent Beaumesnil, ACO Technical 
Director, 2017. Source: Interview].  
The Audi specialised knowledge and extensive experience in LMP1 shed light on superior technological 
trajectories among the broad gamut that the permissive regulations allowed. Specifically, Audi soon realized 
the importance of coupling their new hybrid powertrain within an equally innovative TDI engine. The 
applied advantage (derived from Audi’s specialised knowledge) offset the Toyota’s broader general 
knowledge (mainly based on general automotive knowledge, particularly in hybrid systems—e.g., Toyota 
Prius and many other standard models) in identifying solution in a time where rule changes were providing 
loose indications on superior technological trajectories. Research carefully warns that, despite useful, general 
knowledge does not always grant an effective and high-performing application (Zahra and George, 2002).  
The broader availability of technological options raised the complexity of effectively integrating core 
and peripheral subsystems in functioning product architectures. Simply put, when upgrading a tightly-
coupled component in an architecture, the increasing availability of potentially suitable options escalates the 
number of possible combinations, thus exacerbating the risks of ‘misfit’ (Brusoni et al., 2007). Further, the 
fast-paced nature of hypercompetitive settings (Hoisl et al., 2017) reduces time and opportunities for firms to 
trial the various options. In such conditions, organizations face time-based cognitive limitations (Marino et 
al., 2015) which in turn affect the ability to achieve a high-performing integration across subsystems and/or 
components. Yet, firms with a relevant base of specialised knowledge can sequentially develop a 
technological core first, around which upgrading the peripheral sub-systems in a later phase. This is in line 
with pleiotropy principles (Murmann and Frenken, 2006), where the nested nature of complex systems 
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traditionally allows to leverage more complex knowledge at the core first, to upgrade less complex 
knowledge at the periphery (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Soda and Furlotti, 2017). This in turn allows to foster 
products whose overall design presents radical innovation, while reducing reliability threats that typically 
affect major design overhauls (Marino et al., 2015). 
In our case, Audi had undertaken innovations for the core subsystems (i.e., car chassis, engine, 
aerodynamics, etc.) during prior years (particularly in 2006 and 2011), while radical changes for the 
peripheral subsystems were restricted only to 2012 (which we identified as specialised knowledge at the 
core). When we asked to explain the difference of performance between the Audi R18 e-tron and the Toyota 
TS030, an Audi team member firstly mentioned the “aerodynamic efficiency that we gained from our 
experience of 13 years in endurance racing” [Audi team member, 2016; Source: Interview]. By 
experimenting core upgrades in prior years, Audi could better orchestrate the progressive adoption of radical 
changes at the periphery, and ultimately combining a sufficiently innovative package. Foregoing the 
simultaneous development of radical changes both at the core and peripheral subsystems reduced the 
technological complexity—which could have likely resulted in reliability issues and underperformance. 
Quotes supported this interpretation: 
“Whereas Toyota started almost from scratch, Audi worked on its diesel technology since 2006. They 
had a real advantage from this experience (…) By using the 2011 car’s aerodynamic body, Audi had 
enough time to develop and work on the reliably of the flywheel system.” [Laurent Mercier, Endurance 
Racing journalist and expert, 2016; Source: Interview].  
Toyota’s alternative strategy resulted in a suboptimal outcome. Despite its extensive general knowledge 
in several related settings, Toyota’s entry strategy exclusively focused on radically innovating the peripheral 
subsystems on by nesting them on an out-dated core technology did not suffice to offer a competitive 
advantage against Audi. The car’s overall architecture was traditional in nature, merely incremental from 
industry technological baseline, and thus not suitable to proficiently host the new hybrid subsystem nor to 
unleash its energy potential. Ultimately, the car emerged as unreliable due to misfit issues between core and 
peripheral parts—thus hinting at a suboptimal integration. Accordingly, we suggest: 
Proposition 2. Under conditions of permissive regulations, sequentially innovating core and peripheral 
subsystems will lead to superior performance. 
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4.2.1 2014-15: Restrictive regulations for shifting competitive dynamics 
Described as “a revolution” by the ACO’s sport director (Miller, 2014), the regulations introduced in 
2014 had a restricting, fundamental objective: limiting fuel consumption so that no competitor could gain a 
performance advantage by consuming more fuel than the others (Carter, 2015). The FIA-ACO highlighted in 
multiple occasions their clear intent to keep the regulatory process transparent, inclusive, while avoiding any 
systematic favour to any team. As a matter of fact, this was necessary to demonstrate fairness in the 
competition and attract new car manufacturers to LMP1. Thus, the radical regulation restrictions tightly 
capped fuel consumption and pushed teams into fully exploiting their ERS (Mercier, 2014b). The regulator 
established four different hybrid power categories, each of which was capped at a specific number of Mega-
Joules (i.e., 2MJ; 4MJ; 6MJ; 8MJ), (art.5.2.3, 2014 of technical regulations). All LMP1 hybrid cars had to 
install a fuel flow meter to be checked during the race (art. 5.1, 2014 of technical regulations), and fuel ratio 
was based on the hybrid power category, so that the more energy the ERS released, the less fuel the car was 
allowed to consume—thus creating a constraining trade-off. Competitors could deploy up to two motor 
generator units (MGUs) per car (art. 5.2.1, 2014 of technical regulations). By making boundaries more 
specific, however, the new restrictive rules helped the best technological trajectories emerge.  
“Due to the amount of fuel we allow them to use, the naturally aspired engine was not the optimal 
solution.” [Vincent Beaumesnil, ACO Technical Director, 2017. Source: Interview].  
Like in prior seasons, Audi and Toyota presented diverging technologies for their ERS, but Porsche, the 
new entrant, introduced the most radically innovative solution. Following the 2012-13 regulatory pattern, 
after a year of radical rule change (2014) a more incremental one followed, and in 2015 only few minor 
restrictions were introduced in the regulations, which mostly related to the aerodynamics in the car rear 
sections (art. 3.4, 2015 of technical regulations). 
4.2.2 Firm responses to radical, restrictive regulatory changes (2014) 
After 16 years away from the LMP category, in 2014 Porsche returned to endurance racing with the 
new 919 Hybrid model. This was acclaimed as one of the most radical racing cars ever built (Stoklosa, 
2014), which pioneered ground-breaking solutions both in terms of core and peripheral subsystems. The car 
was powered by a unique turbocharged 2-litre V4 engine—a very unusual engine architecture that had 
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almost never been applied in any major car racing series before.19 Unlike Audi (with the flywheel) and 
Toyota (with the supercapacitor), Porsche chose a system of lithium-ion batteries as ERS storage device, 
which was connected to two different MGUs (Source: Porsche.com, 2014).20 The first MGU was placed on 
the front axle and was similar to the MGU used by Audi and Toyota (Collins, 2014). The second one, 
representing a radical innovation as a peripheral subsystem, collected waste heat in the exhaust pipes and 
transformed it into electrical energy for additional boosts throughout the entire race—this differed from 
competitors that could collect waste energy only during braking 21 (Choy, 2014). This solution took in part 
inspiration from Formula 1 ERS, but was uniquely engineered for LPM1 (Fagnan, 2016). For many expert 
observers, Porsche’s extreme car had potential for superior performance (Collins, 2015), but represented a 
hazard for reliability, especially considering the major ‘mechanical stress’ on components in endurance 
racing.  
“The car as a whole was a redefinition of an endurance car with an extremely innovative architecture, 
the V4 architecture and the two different MGUs connected to lithium-ion batteries were two 
complementary innovations. (…) The V4 architecture was a really ambitious and risky choice with a lot 
of concerns regarding the reliability for long races such as those in endurance” [Alexandre Stricher, 
Endurance Racing Professional, 2016; Source: Interview]. 
Toyota and Audi had formerly disregarded battery systems, as they wanted to avoid the weight increase 
it brought compared to the flywheel and the supercapacitor. Yet, in 2014 it became evident that the battery 
itself had potential for superior powertrain. Coming from two consecutive seasons of domination, in 2014 
Audi chose to continue with its prior technological trajectory and only made incremental changes to the core 
and peripheral subsystems. Talking about Audi’s 2014 model, expert affirmed: 
“The basic elements of the Audi R18 e-tron Quattro’s new configuration were defined back in 2012 and 
the design of all the single components started at the end of 2012.” [WEC Journalist’s quotes (Joest 
Racing, 2014)]. 
                                                   
19 Such solutions was systematically foregone in car design due to an unbalanced overall structure that often generates 
strong vibrations (Choy, 2014)—the V4 design is in fact common rather for motorbikes, rather than cars (Bennetts, 
2015). One exception is the classic Lancia Fulvia that won the world rally championship in 1972 with this engine’s 
architecture (Wan, 2010). 
20 The batteries used by Porsche are lithium-ion, made by A123 Systems. This technology offers a higher energy 
density and was used for the first time on a production vehicle 2010 by Mercedes-Benz with its S400 Hybrid model, 
where however the energy stored and released was significantly more modest than for Porsche 919. Other hybrid car 
manufacturers usually use nickel-metal hybrid batteries (e.g., Toyota Prius): an older and less advanced technology that 
cannot be compared to lithium-ion batteries used in the Porsche 919 Hybrid (Miller, 2015) 
21 This system is different from the one used in F1 called MGU-H (Source: Formula1.com, 2016). Indeed, the Porsche 
system used two turbines linked to a turbo-charger layout and to an electric generator, while F1’s layout is linked to a 
turbo acting as ERS and as anti-lag (Collins, 2015). 
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The 2014 Audi R18 e-tron used the same single ERS system and the same flywheel system of the 2012 
model. Audi was classified as a lower energy category (i.e., 4MJ) compared to Porsche and Toyota (i.e., both 
in the 6MJ category) and therefore could use more fuel—thus creating incentives for a bigger engine, whose 
capacity was increased up to 4.0 litres. Even though still turbo diesel-powered (V6 TDI), the engine 
underwent a redesign that made it lighter than in 2012 (Mercier, 2014a). Finally, the 2014 Audi R18 also 
featured a chassis made of composite materials to reduce the weight—the overall design was however in line 
with the former one.22 
Using a different strategy than its competitors, Toyota developed for 2014 a new TS040 Hybrid vehicle 
presenting a radical evolution to the previous TS030 (Collins, 2014).  
“As a team, we learnt a lot in our first two seasons in WEC and all this know-how has gone into our 
new TS040 Hybrid, which is the most technologically-advanced Toyota ever to compete on the track.” 
[Yoshiaki Kinoshita, Toyota team president in Lavrinc (2014)]. 
The Japanese constructor underwent several radical changes, thus finally matching an innovative 
peripheral subsystem to what had been so far a quite out-dated core subsystem within a traditional vehicle 
architecture. Indeed, if the naturally-aspirated V8 was still supported by a kinetic ERS, the brand-new engine 
with increased capacity (from 3.4 to 3.7 litres) displayed an improved combustion system and was coupled to 
an additional MGU transforming the car to a four-wheel drive with 998 hp (Prince, 2014). The TS040 was 
the first car in endurance racing whose ERS could recover energy from the four wheels (Hanlon, 2014) and it 
now massively benefitted from Toyota’s prior experience in LMP1. The development of this double ERS 
system was coupled with a redesign of each MGU to obtain overall more power (Collins, 2014). The chassis 
as well underwent a radical redesign with unique aerodynamic solutions (Collins, 2014). The main objective 
of this effort was clearly explained by Toyota’s executives: 
“New regulations always create a challenge and the obvious challenges for 2014 have been to change 
so many things at the same time, with significant regulation changes in terms of chassis and powertrain. 
The main challenge has been to create a more complex car with more hybrid hardware to achieve 
higher hybrid power and at the same time reduce significantly the weight due to a 45kg reduction in 
minimum weight.” [Pascal Vasselon, Toyota Racing Group Technical Director in Collins (2014)]. 
                                                   
22 Interestingly, Audi’s original plan also included an additional ERS (as for Porsche) aimed at recovering waste heat 
from exhaust pipes but the idea was ultimately abandoned few weeks before the season started and never featured in 
2014 (Joest Racing, 2014). 
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4.2.3 Firm responses to incremental, restrictive regulatory changes (2015) 
In 2015 all three competing teams deployed and improved version of their 2014 car models, thus 
fundamentally pursuing the same technological trajectory they had started the year before.23 Porsche 
presented an evolution of its 919 Hybrid model that was aimed at tuning the peripheral subsystem in its 
hybrid components to reach the top energy category (8MJ).  
“The team’s 2015 World Endurance Championship challenger is a ground-up design based on the 
same concept as the original 919.” (Watkins, 2015) 
At the architectural level Porsche developed a similar chassis designed as a single unit rather than in 
two parts as in 2014, which increased rigidity while reducing weight. Also, it developed three aerodynamic 
packages to better adapt to the different tracks, which included a new nose and splitter (Collins, 2017).  
Finally it advanced a new twin exhaust system aimed at making the engine lighter (Tutu, 2015). Those 
changes can be defined as incremental since they are only progressive evolutions of previous technologies, 
which, however, did not change the basic design and engineering principles.  
Toyota presented a very similar car to its 2014 winning model (Noah, 2015).  
“The regulations have been essentially stable so there was no reason to review completely our concept, 
considering our performance throughout 2014. So, the updated car is no revolution but it’s an evolution 
almost everywhere.” [Pascal Vasselon, Toyota Racing Group Technical Director, in Noah (2015)]. 
 At the core subsystems, Toyota tweaked the 2014 chassis design and fostered an improved 
aerodynamic package (Collins, 2015). Also, the suspensions (peripheral subsystems) were redesigned to 
reduce tire wear (Noah, 2015). 
Finally, Audi changed its car to offset the disappointing performance drop in 2014. Engineers 
incrementally worked on the peripheral subsystems by increasing the storage capacity of the flywheel, thus 
allowing Audi to be classified in the 4MJ power category (Audi, 2015) while reaching a 40% energy 
increase to the electric motor (Florea, 2015). The 4.0 litre engine was also upgraded to release more energy 
(Florea, 2015) while the aerodynamic package presented new front wings and sidepods.  
                                                   
23 in 2015 Nissan entered LMP1 hybrid with a new model. However, it competed for only one race, and thus we did not 
include it in our analyses. 
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4.2.4 Effects on performance 2014-15 and propositions 
The 2014 LMP1 season presented significantly different results compared to previous years. After 
solving its reliability issue and maturing an overall innovative car both in terms of core and peripheral 
subsystems, Toyota obtained the manufacturer championship by winning 5 times with at least one car on the 
podium at each race (see Table A4 in the Appendix). On the contrary, former champion Audi dropped to 
second place. Once again, Audi’s challenger proved to be a solid, reliable car—which was confirmed by 
Audi’s victory at the 24h of Le Mans in 2015. Yet, it also soon appeared increasingly clearer that Audi and 
Toyota had tapped their technologies’ performance potential, and without major innovation breakthrough 
they would have been hopelessly outclassed.  
“I think the TDI technology was at its maximum of capacity, they could not extract more performance 
from it. Same situation for the hybrid system, we all know that a flywheel cannot generate enough 
energy to be successful under the 2014 regulations. They needed to change but for that you need to 
invest a huge amount of money and to think outside the box. (…) You cannot offer a high level of 
competitiveness when your car is in the lowest energy category.” [Laurent Mercier, Endurance Racing 
journalist and expert; Source: Interview 2016]. 
Instead, in its first year in LMP1 Porsche paid a high price for its bold approach to radical innovation 
and faced severe reliability issues during the first part of the season (Lamarche, 2014). Porsche finished last, 
but it obtained a victory in the final race of 2014. Such progression hinted at the Porsche’s potential, which 
matured in 2015 when it leapfrogged all the competitors throughout the entire racing season, and left only 2 
victories to Audi—which, however, failed to win the 24h of Le Mans for the first time in 6 years (see the 
Appendix for detailed race results).  
In 2014 and 2015 regulatory restrictions clarified the performance ceilings of each competing 
technology. For example, the flywheel system—which was originally considered offering the highest 
potential—under tighter restrictions emerged as worryingly underperforming. Clearer regulatory guidelines 
reduced causal ambiguity between available technologies and performance outcomes, and overall firms 
faced less technological uncertainty. New rule specifications also capped the performance of the flywheel 
and the supercapacitor, thus creating strong incentives for firms to move towards other technological options 
such as the lithium-ion batteries—which had previously dismissed. For example, Audi realized that its 
former choice of running a diesel engine with a double ERS clashed with weight limitations, and thus 
decided to move to the battery system (in 2016). Evidence from our expert informants corroborates this 
interpretation. 
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“In 2013, we tested a car equipped with a double ERS system to use the room given by the 2014 
regulation. Unfortunately, this double ERS system was not deployable with the weight limit established 
by the regulation for the diesel engines (…) it was too late for us to try another storage system.” 
[Engineer at Audi Sport; Source: Interview 2016].  
It is reasonable to notice how, already in 2013, the flywheel and supercapacitor were giving signals of 
their limited performance potential. Yet, in line with former literature (Suarez and Lanzolla, 2005, 2007), we 
notice that the abrupt and restrictive regulatory shift in 2015 further exacerbated the already rapid S-curve of 
older technologies’ life-cycle—given the hypercompetitive nature or LMP1—thus increasing the firms’ 
incentives towards other technological trajectories. Given the above, we claim: 
Corollary to Proposition 1. Restrictive regulations reduce technological uncertainty in the form of 
causal ambiguity between technological solutions and performance outcomes.  
Corollary to Proposition 1a. Reduced technological uncertainty increases firms’ tendency to shift their 
technological trajectory. 
Similarly to other similar settings, regulations (despite restrictive) did not harness firm efforts for 
innovation (Jenkins, 2014a); on the contrary, the racing teams explored different innovation strategies by 
adapting to both permissive and restrictive rule changes. Despite not straitjacketed, evidence suggest that 
restrictive rules clustered the competitors’ innovations across a limited and more adjacent set of 
technological trajectories.  
“After 3 or 4 years of competition I am not surprised to see competitors converging to the same 
technological solution. By pushing their engineers, all competitors fund a glass ceiling to their own 
technology.” [Vincent Beaumesnil, ACO Technical Director, 2017. Source: Interview]. 
Accordingly, by diminishing technological heterogeneity, relative performance differences across 
competitors reduced. Particularly Toyota and Audi’s performance gap got significantly smaller (e.g., Audi 
and Toyota moved from a gap of 74 points in 2012, to 64.5 points in 2013 and a gap of 45 points in 2014). 
Contenders that tried to further refine older technologies tapped their performance potential and lost ground 
in the competition: 
“(…) The original calculations by Toyota’s powertrain department suggested that a large-capacity 
naturally aspirated engine would be the most efficient solution and this was in principle correct. But 
that was only true within a specific operating window. (…) The biggest issue we faced in 2015 was 
powertrain performance; our rival (i.e., Porsche) made significant gains in this area but our powertrain 
was mature, with very little extra performance to find. It became clear very quickly that we needed a 
new powertrain (…).” [Marketing manager Toyota Motorsport; Source: Interview 2016]. 
In fact, while in 2012 and 2013 Audi’s long experience in this racing category helped identifying 
superior technological trajectories, thus quickly obtaining and maintaining an advantage for two seasons in a 
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row, in 2014 Porsche’s minor levels of specialised knowledge (both at the periphery and the core 
subsystems—see Table 5) allowed the newcomer to innovate with a ‘blue-sky approach’ and free from 
inertial constraints towards any prior technological investment. Porsche thus decided to challenge 
incumbents with a radically new car that better interpreted and exploited the (now more certain) 
technological boundaries defined by the restrictive rules; the German team invested on a successful medium-
to-long term strategy, which led to obtaining the championship in 2015 (and later in 2016 and 2017). It is 
noteworthy that—differently from permissive regulations—when restrictive regulatory changes are enforced, 
new constraints seem to pose more challenges to incumbents with longer technological experience and 
established specialised knowledge, than to newcomers. In fact, the former might have found themselves 
investing in technological trajectories that the new regulatory restrictions later harnessed. Retrospectively, 
ACO’s technical director in fact affirmed: 
“I would rather say they [i.e., the new entrants] are less disadvantaged than their competitors already 
present in the championship. This is why there is an interest for a new entrant to come in the 
championship the year of a radical change in the regulation than at another time.” [Vincent 
Beaumesnil, ACO Technical Director, 2017. Source: Interview]. 
 In general terms, while prior knowledge and capabilities might represent an asset to further pursue 
technological innovation in relatively deregulated environments, in restrictive environments they become a 
core rigidity that can backfire in case the former solutions—and their related knowledge and routines—do 
not fit the incoming restrictions (Leonard-Barton, 1992). The fact that Audi and Toyota did not change their 
technological trajectory—despite enjoying major budgets and openly acknowledging that their technological 
solutions had tapped a performance ceiling—further corroborates this intuition.  
Another interesting insight emerges from observing the firms’ innovation strategies across core and 
peripheral subsystems. Ditto, restrictive regulations clearly identified superior technological trajectories both 
at the core and peripheral subsystems. In such conditions, innovating core and peripheral subsystems in two 
sequential phases did not emerge as the most effective long-term strategy. Table 5 shows that Toyota and 
Audi opted for a two-phased innovation strategy, while Porsche decided to simultaneously upgrade core and 
peripheral subsystems—both Porsche’s subsystems underwent radical innovations in 2014 and incremental 
in 2015. Such strategy allowed Porsche to early identify complementarities across component technologies 
(Lee et al., 2010), thus pursuing a well-integrated development across the entire product architecture. 
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Experts’ quotes hints at Porsche ability to early on combine complementary technologies and jointly develop 
them. 
“(Porsche’s) V4 architecture and the two different MGUs connected to lithium-ion batteries were two 
complementary innovations. If you choose batteries as storage, you need a smaller engine due to the 
weight restrictions imposed by the technical regulations and the space taken by the batteries. Their 
MGU-H was composed by two turbines incorporated in the exhaust system and was designed for a V4 
mono turbo engine. Their choice regarding the powertrain forced them to find a solution for their 
heating recovery system.” [Alexandre Stricher, 2016—endurance racing media expert; Source: 
Interview 2016]. 
In multiple occasions, the experts underlined how Porsche’s strategy ideally fit the rule restrictions: 
“Porsche was smart enough to use a grey zone in the regulation with their ERS-H. They got energy ‘for 
free’ as the system didn’t deteriorate the specific consumption. The only way to match their pace was to 
jump to higher ERS classes” [Engineer at Audi Sport, 2016; Source: Interview].  
To summarize, it emerges how restrictive regulations reduce the options for subsystem integration, thus 
making the product architecture more rigid, and subsystems more tightly-coupled. This in turn limits the 
opportunities for explorations of different combinations between core and peripheral technologies, and 
favours instead a joint development of both subsystems. Sequential subsystem innovation prolongs 
technological imbalances due to an uneven rate of technological change, as well as complex integration 
challenges between core and peripheral parts. A joint development of core and peripheral subsystems, 
however, implies a major increase in design complexity, which scholars identify as a challenge that 
traditionally arises when entire product architectures undergo design overhauls—particularly under radical 
regulatory shifts (Marino et al., 2015). This explains while such trajectory might take longer to provide 
superior returns. In fact, in season 2014 Porsche’s reliability problems left space for Toyota’s success. Still, 
Toyota’s dominance soon appeared as short-lived: starting with 2015 (and continuing in 2016 and 2017) 
Porsche solved the aforementioned reliability issues and dominated LMP1 thanks to a vehicle that was 
equally innovative and balanced. We thus conjecture: 
Corollary to Proposition 2. Under conditions of restrictive regulations, simultaneously innovating core 
and peripheral subsystems will lead to superior performance in the long term. 
The diagrams in Figure 1 depict the models underlying the propositions and their corollaries. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The impact of regulation on markets and competition is not only a central topic in financial markets, 
economics, political economy and management (see for example Rochet and Tirole, 2005), but it also fuels 
timely and compelling debates across multiple settings of international policy—from gas emission control 
(European Commission, 2016) to international trading regulation (Timiraos et al., 2016). Regulations create 
incentives for innovation and disrupt markets by sometimes inhibiting, sometimes promoting new 
technologies and business models (Blind, 2012; Blind et al., 2017). For centuries, nations and industries have 
relied on regulations to steer the direction of economic development and competition (Buysse and Verbeke, 
2003; Mahon and Murray, 1981; Porter, 1980; Reger et al., 1992). Yet, scholars lament that the literature on 
this timely topic is still scarce (Blind, 2012, p. 395) controversial (Blind et al., 2017, p. 249) and more often 
than not concentrated on explaining the impact of regulation on firm innovation productivity (Jaffe and 
Palmer, 1997). Yet, and perhaps more importantly, we know very little about which type of firm innovation 
responses better fit different regulatory shifts, particularly when variations in restrictive vs. permissive 
regulatory frameworks occur. In response to calls for studies on this pivotal and yet understudied topic 
(Blind, 2012) our work examines the association between firms’ innovation and performance under 
regulatory changes of different direction—i.e., permissive vs. restrictive—(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; 
McCarthy et al., 2010). To further enrich our understanding, we dedicated specific attention to patterns of 
innovation across different product subsystems (i.e., core vs. peripheral components as per Henderson and 
Clark, 1990) and carefully considered prior experience in technological development—in the form of general 
and specialised knowledge (Grant, 1996). Such analytical framework offers not only implications firm 
performance (Marino et al., 2015), but thanks to a longitudinal research design it also sheds light on 
innovation macro-processes across different technological trajectories (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Dosi, 1982; 
Jenkins and Floyd, 2001). 
Our study—we believe—contributes to a compelling research inquiry and offers insights that are at the 
same time new and unexpected vis-à-vis what current literature suggests. Given the major gap in the 
literature, we discuss the novelty of our contribution by mostly focusing on the few works that directly 
address our specific question (e.g., Marino et al., 2015; Reger et al., 1992; Smith and Grimm, 1987). 
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Our evidence confirms that both regulations whose aims are permissive or restrictive trigger innovation 
responses at the firm level (Jenkins, 2014a; Marino et al., 2015; Smith and Grimm, 1987). Yet, by promoting 
technological heterogeneity, permissive regulations tend to shadow the performance ceiling of different 
options, increase causal ambiguity between different solutions and performance, and foster overall 
technological uncertainty (proposition 1), thus in turn reducing firm tendency to switch towards other 
technological trajectories (proposition 1a). Such findings point to unexpected outcomes, given bourgeoning 
evidence that policy makers and organizations often associate deregulation to an antecedent of technological 
heterogeneity at the firm level.  
Further reflections are also worth being considered in relation to optimal firm responses. Former studies 
highlighted how radical regulatory changes favour firm incremental innovation, and vice-versa incremental 
regulatory changes favour firm’s radical innovation (Marino et al., 2015). We confirm that looking at the 
mere magnitude of firm innovation at a specific point in time might not be sufficient to reveal the entire set 
of intervening mechanisms and patterns, unless the analysis carefully includes pivotal aspects such as the 
direction of change (i.e., permissive vs. restrictive as per Reger et al., 1992) the firm’s prior knowledge 
(Grant, 1996) across both core and peripheral subsystems of the complex product architecture (Murmann and 
Frenken, 2006). We notice that in hypercompetitive technological settings, firm’s radical innovations might 
in general provide superior returns—sometimes in the short, sometimes in the long run. This is the exact 
opposite to what Marino et al. (2015) predict in a very similar competitive setting (i.e., F1), but it is 
important to notice that this study only focused on short-term results and their setting only allowed to 
observe the magnitude of regulatory change. We thus remark that conditions of permissive vs. restrictive 
regulations—when present—might determine significantly different outcomes. 
Our study also provides nuanced evidence on the mechanisms taking place at the subsystem level and 
across the overall system architecture (Brusoni et al., 2001; Henderson and Clark, 1990), which also revolve 
around executives’ cognitive limitations (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Marino et al., 2015; Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000) in the form of causal ambiguity (Powell et al., 2006; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) and technological 
uncertainty (Fleming, 2001). Permissive rules increase the span of possible technological options, thus 
making product architectures more flexible. This means that—following a nested hierarchy of subsystems—
for a given core component, firms can choose across a broader array of different peripheral integrations. 
Hence, firms can better face complex design optimization by adopting a sequential (i.e., multi-phased) 
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approach to innovation, by upgrading the core subsystems first, and in a later phase by identifying and 
integrating the most suitable peripheral subsystem (proposition 2). This resonates with the literature on 
system complexity (Simon, 1962), and the principle of pleiotropy (Murmann and Frenken, 2006), which 
highlights how a nested hierarchy of subsystems allows an upgrade of the periphery thanks to the superior 
knowledge acquired in core technology development (Soda and Furlotti, 2014).  
Under conditions of radical rule restrictions, former research predicts that incremental firm’s innovation 
responses would reduce the architectural (re)design challenges, and thus lead to superior performance 
(Marino et al., 2015). We also find that in such years, incremental decision offer superior returns, but we add 
that the advantages emerge as short-lived. In fact, radical responses that fully embrace the new restrictive 
regulatory framework seem to provide opportunities for sustained competitive advantage in the long-run.24 
By severely reducing the portfolio of options across alternative technologies, restrictive regulatory shifts 
decrease opportunities for complementary subsystem integration (simply put, for each core technology an 
inferior number or peripheral subsystems can be successfully fit in the product architecture). This in turn 
sheds lights onto the few specific solutions that hold potential for superior performance. In such conditions, 
uncertainty and causal ambiguity decrease, as the performance ceilings of different solutions emerge more 
distinctively (corollary to proposition 1), therefore increasing the firms’ incentive to move towards more 
promising technological trajectories (corollary to proposition 1a). This promotes technological heterogeneity 
and different performance across the competitors. More stringent regulations limit the potential for 
components integration, and thus constrain the overall product design, and the available portfolio of possible 
solution. In such case, firms enjoy superior returns when they early on explore possible complementarities 
among the few viable subsystems—that means, simultaneously innovating both core and peripheral 
subsystems. In line with former predictions under restrictive regulations (Marino et al., 2015), our results 
point to inferior returns in the short term—mostly due to rising complexity and reliability issues, which are 
common to major architectural overhauls. However, once the firm resolves such technical holdups, their 
joint development across core and peripheral subsystems leads to superior performance in the long term 
(corollary to proposition 2). 
                                                   
24 See the case of Mercedes anticipating engine research to dominate the hybrid era in Formula 1 (Moldrich, 2016). 
 
 
 
37 
We believe our findings offer a valuable contribution to management literature, particularly at the 
intersection of technological innovation, regulations and environmental changes. We respond to recent calls 
for more precise appreciation of the diverse nature of environmental dynamism (McCarthy et al., 2010, p. 
622), and—by singling out the interplay between regulation and firm innovation—we start exploring “the 
nature and the scope of the control provided by new regulations” (McCarthy et al., 2010, p. 609). If previous 
studies have already investigated the mechanisms making a firm successful when the environment changes 
in a radical or incremental way (e.g., Marino et al., 2015), the direction taken by the environmental change 
(i.e., permissive vs. restrictive) had not previously been considered (for an exception see Smith and Grimm, 
1987). Further, we engage with a major stream of technology-related literature (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; 
Brusoni et al., 2001; Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Jacobides et al., 2016) and 
provide a dynamic explanation of how choices in different product subsystems (i.e., core vs. peripheral 
components) are affected by different environmental shifts (Benner and Tushman, 2002). We aim at 
specifically responding to recent calls lamenting that scholars “have only recently begun to consider the 
distinction of core and peripheral technologies” (Murmann and Frenken 2006; p. 933). Our longitudinal 
research design follows and complements prior studies on technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982), not only 
by embracing a multi-level approach that includes (regulatory) institutions, firms and technologies (Jenkins 
and Floyd, 2001), but also by exploring the role of prior knowledge assets (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) in the 
form of general and specialised knowledge (Balconi, 2002; Grant, 1996). Our evidence counter-intuitively 
suggests that even in knowledge-intensive settings, prior knowledge investments might lead to different 
returns vis-à-vis the contingent regulatory framework. While in hypercompetition general knowledge only 
partially offers a systematic advantage to firms, specialised knowledge holds relevant value in directing 
innovation decisions during regulatory shifts. Yet, such knowledge assets become a liability once regulations 
tighten, and related capabilities and routines become a rigidity and a source of inertia (Leonard-Barton, 
1992). This suggests valuable insights on boundary conditions that might explain mixed results and inverted-
U shape effects between prior technological experience and performance (Gupta et al., 2006; Zhou and Wu, 
2010), as well as interesting perspectives to explore the role of new entrants and incumbent’s short-lived 
competitive advantages (D'Aveni et al., 2010). Further, we underline how different approaches to 
innovation—i.e., sequential vs. simultaneous—might better fit not only different environmental dynamics 
and product life-cycles (Suarez and Lanzolla, 2007), but also different regulatory contingencies—i.e., 
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permissive vs. restrictive rules—, thus holding promises for sustainable competitive advantage for firms that 
better interpret critical environmental changes (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; D'Aveni et al., 2010). 
Our work also aims to offer a valuable and applicable contribution to practice. Executives are often 
confronted with the challenging task of adapting their innovation to transient environments (Christensen, 
1997)—in these regards, regulatory shifts are a very common and thorny contingency to face. In our work a 
practical contribution stands out: we suggests a framework to better interpret regulatory changes, forecast 
competitive dynamics, and ultimately optimize innovation efforts—while considering the advantages that 
incumbents or new entrants might enjoy in permissive or restrictive contingences, respectively (Suarez and 
Lanzolla, 2005). It is plausible to notice how companies and business leaders tend to prefer deregulated 
markets and competitive settings, where they can more freely pursue innovation (Timiraos, 2017). Yet, we 
warn executives not to underestimate the complexity arising from such contingencies. The lack of precise 
guidelines increases causal ambiguity and uncertainty about superior technological solutions. This might 
lead to severe cognitive challenges and ultimately result into suboptimal decisions—despite firms’ extensive 
knowledge-base to address such tasks. Similar dynamics might explain the recent failure of major 
automotive manufacturers in trying to redeploy their extensive expertise in the road-car segment (or even a 
prior racing experience) into cutting-edge settings that leave competitors relatively free to innovate—see 
Toyota, Jaguar, BMW and more recent Honda’s fiascos in Formula 1. This might also inform similar failures 
in emerging (and thus deregulated) contexts, such as Virgin trying to develop a commercial spaceflights (i.e., 
Virgin Galactic) by leveraging its technological and business expertise in commercial airways (Novak, 
2014). This is—to a certain degree—consistent with Smith and Grimm (1987), which praise the adoption of 
more focused (and thus applied) approaches during deregulation. Yet, within the realm of such technology-
based competition, our study further specifies the boundary conditions and innovation patterns leading to 
diverging performance outcomes.25 
We purposefully chose to conduct our study in a setting whose simplified features support in-depth 
qualitative cross-case comparisons in a longitudinal fashion—a research design that has been deemed as 
ideal for regulation-specific studies (Blind, 2012, p. 395). Despite ours is the first work on the iconic Le 
Mans racing, former works have already leveraged regulatory changes in other motorsports to offer 
                                                   
25 Smith and Grimm (1987) instead observe the impact of firm broader strategies (such as marketing and sales) in a 
condition of deregulation the railroad industry. 
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generalizable insights that naturally apply to other heavily regulated industries (Marino et al., 2015). Clearly, 
the nature of our study also carries several limitations; and yet, if carefully acknowledged, these can shed 
light on promising avenues for new research. First, our qualitative approach does not allow to rigorously test 
causality, but only to observe mere association patterns. This excludes the possibility to control for other 
intervening factors that could play a role in explaining performance returns (in particular individual-level 
effects). Among those—and despite evidence suggest that regulators did not systematically favour any 
competitor in LMP1—we cannot fully rule out the possible intervention of firms’ secret lobbying (Gurses 
and Ozcan, 2015; Ozcan and Gurses, 2017), regulatory capture, and possible information asymmetry (a 
common and to a certain extent unavoidable aspect, as suggested by Blind et al., 2017; and Stigler, 1971). 
Second, scholars warn that fierce innovations races, dynamic and competitive reshuffling among rivals, and 
other peculiar hypercompetitive features of motorsport settings (Hoisl et al., 2017) might not well resemble 
those of more traditional industries, where environmental shifts are rare, firms’ competitive advantages are 
long-lived, and learning curves for process innovations, economies of scale, and efficiency-based objectives 
play a major role for firm outcomes. We thus recommend avoiding uncritical extensions of our insights to 
more traditional, slow-paced industries. Third, firms in our empirical setting exercise great secrecy on their 
research and development activities. This means that budgets are seldom revealed, and patenting is 
incredibly rare. This does not allow to adopt established measures to track important intervening factors in 
technological exploration, such as the firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and 
George, 2002)—which might in part explain some of the performance outcomes. However, our tracking of 
firms’ prior knowledge provides an alternative proxy which might help consider important issues in part 
related to absorptive capacity. One could wonder whether superior knowledge in a specific technology might 
lead to better learning abilities for future knowledge absorption—perhaps by collaborating with third parties 
(Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Our work does not resolve this key point, but offers a guidelines for future 
studies where traditional measures for tracking absorptive capacity are available. Fourth, our setting keeps 
the frequency of regulatory change constant as LMP1 rules are released on a yearly basis; also, new releases 
are communicated to all players in advance—thus making them predictable. Yet, frequency and 
predictability are fundamental aspects that also deserve further investigation (Reger et al., 1992; Ungson et 
al., 1985), not only for their individual effects, but also for a broader interplay with the other dimensions or 
environmental changes. Finally, racing competitions are measured on racing performance, which equals to a 
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measure of product—rather than financial—effectiveness. Despite racing success usually correlates to better 
financial performance (Mourao, 2017; Sylt and Reid, 2010), we suggest caution when extending 
interpretations of product performance to other types of organizational outcomes.  
All in all, we hope that future endeavours might better tackle the open issues left by our contribution, 
which nonetheless might provide a valuable starting point to shed light on the complex issues of regulatory 
shifts in competitive environments.  
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FIGURE 1 
Relation between regulations, firms’ technological innovation and performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sequential core – peripheral 
subsystem innovation
Technological performance
Permissive regulations
+
Simultaneous core – peripheral 
subsystem innovation
Restrictive regulations
-
- +
Proposition 2
Corollary to Proposition 2
 
 
 
42 
TABLE 1 
Review table of the studies exploring the relation between firm innovation and changes in the regulation 
 
 
      Firm innovation 
      Radical Incremental 
Regulations 
Magnitude of change 
Radical Negative effects* Positive effects* 
Incremental Positive effects* Negative effects* 
Direction of change 
Restrictive Negative effects** 
Permissive Positive effects** 
Frequency of change 
High frequency Positive if incremental*** 
Low frequency (Not applicable) 
Predictability of change 
High predictability Positive effects**** 
Low predictability Negative effects**** 
          
*Marino et al. 2015; Notes = The focus is on firm innovation. The direction of regulatory change is not considered. Frequency of 
change is constant (once a year). Predictability of the setting is high. 
**Smith and Grimm, 1987; Notes = The focus is not on innovation, but on the firm’s strategic change. Frequency relates to a 
single major deregulation event. There is no comparative analysis in cases of restrictive regulations. There is no specification on 
the magnitude of firm responses (i.e., radical vs. incremental). 
***Reger et al., 1992; Notes = The focus is on "incrementalism", which stands for the possibility of introducing progressive major 
regulatory changes. Setting: risk and financial performance in banking. There is no specification on the magnitude of firm 
responses (i.e., radical vs. incremental). 
****Ungson et al., 1985; Notes = The focus is on the predictability of change. Firms can absorb the shock of major regulation 
changes when predictable. Despite the setting is technology-based, there is no reference to the innovation options that might 
maximize firm performance. Direction and frequency of change are not considered. 
 
 
 
43 
TABLE 2 
Data sources 
 
Types of source Sources Nr. of docs Pages 
 
Books 
 
24 heures du Mans 80 éditions de légende (Palmet, 2012) 
 
1 
 
4  
24 heures du Mans 90 ans de passion (Palmet, 2013) 2 3  
Art of Le Mans Race Car: 90 years of speed (Codlin, 2013) 1 8 
    
Technical Press Racecar Engineering 12 36  
L'Automobile Magazine (France) 3 6  
Motor Sport Magazine 1 6 
 
Road and Track Magazine 3 6  
EVO Magazine 4 10 
    
General Press L’Equipe (France) 1 3  
Ouest France (France) 2 4  
Le Maine Libre (France) 3 6 
    
Websites Endurance-info.com 8 21  
Toyota-global.com 10 16  
Porsche.com 6 11  
Joest-racing.de 3 9  
Caranddriver.com 2 5  
Fiawec.com 8 20  
Lemans.org 4 10  
Williamsf1.com 1 2  
Leblogauto.com 1 4  
Imotortimes.com 1 1  
Greencarcongress.com 2 2  
Driving.co.uk 3 5  
Others 12 23 
    
Videos Toyota UK Youtube channel 3 n.a.  
Audi Youtube channel 2 n.a.  
Porsche Youtube channel 3 n.a.  
Jpetrolhad Youtube channel 2 n.a.  
Nuvolari Channel 5 n.a.  
Technological vehicles Youtube channel 1 n.a. 
    110 221 
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TABLE 3 
Direct interviews with experts 
 
Name Job/role Expert’s profile Hours 
 Vincent Beaumesnil ACO’s Technical Director 
Director of the Governing body in charge of 
the WEC regulations 2 
Laurent Mercier Endurance media expert 
Editor in chief of the leading French 
language website for endurance racing 1 
Bernard Beaumesnil Endurance expert Former engineer, external consultant on technical regulations for the ACO 2 
Alexandre Stricher Endurance media expert 
Former in charge of the communication for 
Alpine LMP2, blogger 2 
Alastair Moffitt Endurance professional 
Marketing manager Toyota Motorsport 
GmbH 2 
Daniel Perdrix Endurance professional 
Former technical director of the Automobile 
Club de l'Ouest (ACO) 1 
Anonymous Endurance professional Currently working as engineer at Audi Sport 2 
   12 
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TABLE 4 
Qualitative codification of change at the environment level (i.e., regulations)   
Season Coding Empirical evidences 
2012 
Radical and 
permissive 
regulations 
New to the field, permissive rules:   
- Freedom of choice concerning the Energy Recovering System (ERS) 
but limited to two wheels only (art. 1.13, 2012 technical regulations). 
 - Different ERS systems proposed explicitly by regulations: flywheel; 
capacitors; different types of batteries (art. 1.14.1; 1.14.2; 1.14.3, 2012 
technical regulations).  
- Permissive definition of Hybrid: “to be considered as hybrid the car 
must be able to move along the whole length of the pit lane”, giving 
rooms for innovation (art. 1.13, 2012 technical regulations). 
 - Modifications through the season authorized under homologation by 
the ACO (art. 1.2.2, 2012 technical regulations). 
- If ERS connected to the front wheels, the energy release can happen 
above 120 km/h (art. 1.13, 2012 technical regulations). 
- Power released by the ERS only limited at 0.5 MJ between two 
braking stints. (art. 1.13, 2012 technical regulations). 
- Overall: hybrid system increases car performances (Laurent Mercier, 
2012). 
      
2013 Incremental and permissive 
Used in the field, permissive rules:  
- Few changes related to the air extractors dimensions and the read 
diffuser size (art. 3.4.5 and 3.5.2, 2013 technical regulations). 
      
2014 Radical and restrictive  
New to the field, restrictive rules: 
- Creation of a new category called LMP1-H for manufacturer hybrid 
cars only (art. 1.1, 2014 technical regulations). 
- 4 different hybrid power categories are established: 2MJ; 4MJ; 6MJ; 
8MJ corresponding to the limit of power released from Motor 
Generator Unit (MGU) during the equivalent of one lap of Le Mans 
circuit (art. 5.2.3 and Appendix B, 2014 technical regulations). 
    
- The quantity of fuel allowed is inversely proportional to the hybrid 
system power. A limitation is established concerning the fuel mass 
flow (art 5.1, 2014 technical regulations). 
    
- All competitors must integrate a fuel flow meter into the fuel system 
to control fuel flow (art. 6.2.1, 2014 technical regulations). 
    
- Limit to two ERS systems per car (art. 5.2.1, 2014 technical 
regulations). 
    
- Overall: hybrid system controlled to reduce the fuel consumption 
(FIA press release, 2013). 
      
2015 Incremental and restrictive  
Used in the field, restrictive rules:  
- New definition of Motor Generator Unit (MGU) (art. 1.21, 2015 
technical regulations). 
 - New rules regulating the rear part of the car bodywork (art. 3.4, 2015 
technical regulations). 
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TABLE 5 
Summary of firm and environment level codification 
    2012 2013 2014 2015 
Environment 
level 
Magnitude of regulation change Radical  Incremental Radical  Incremental 
Direction of regulation change  Permissive Permissive Restrictive Restrictive 
            
Firm level           
First Ranked (winner) Audi R18 e-tron Audi R18 e-tron Toyota TS040 Porsche 919 
Magnitude of innovation         
    Core subsystem innovation Incremental No change  Radical Incremental 
    Peripheral subsystem innovation Radical  Incremental  Incremental  Incremental 
Prior Knowledge         
    General knowledge Peripheral Peripheral Peripheral and Core Periph. + Core 
    Specialized knowledge Core Periph. + Core Peripheral and Core Periph. + Core 
          
Second ranked Toyota TS030 Toyota TS030 Audi R18 e-tron Audi R18 e-tron 
Magnitude of innovation         
    Core subsystem innovation Incremental  Incremental  Incremental  No change  
    Peripheral subsystem innovation Radical  Incremental  No change  Incremental  
Prior Knowledge         
    General knowledge Periph. + Core Periph. + Core Peripheral Peripheral 
    Specialized knowledge Core (minor) Periph. + Core Periph. + Core Periph. + Core 
          
Third ranked - - Porsche 919 Toyota TS040 
Magnitude of innovation         
    Core subsystem innovation - - Radical Incremental  
    Peripheral subsystem innovation - - Radical  No change  
Prior Knowledge         
    General knowledge - - Periph. (minor) + Core (minor) Periph. + Core 
    Specialized knowledge - - Periph. (minor) + Core (minor) Periph. + Core 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLE A1 
Glossary of technical terms 
 
 
Automobile Club de l’Ouest (ACO): The largest automotive club in France that organises the 
race of the 24 hours of Le Mans as well as the WEC Championship in cooperation with the FIA. 
Energy Recovery System (ERS): A kinetic energy recovery system (often simply termed as 
KERS, or ERS) is an automotive system for recovering a moving vehicle's kinetic energy under 
braking (KERS) or from exhaust pipes (ERS). The recovered energy is stored in a reservoir (for 
example a flywheel, high voltage batteries or a supercapacitor) for later use on acceleration. 
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA): The largest automotive association in the 
world that has organizes and licenses the Formula 1 championship, the Word Rally 
Championship and the Word Endurance Championship.  
Le Mans Prototype 1 (LMP1): The category of the most powerful and technologically advanced 
endurance cars used in the WEC. Prototype describes a type of car that is only designed for 
racing in contrast with Grand Tourer that is used to describe a racing car elaborated from a road 
car. The hybrid sub-category in LMP1 is called LMP1-H. 
Flywheel system:  The mechanical system that stores energy by the use of a rotor spinning at a 
very high speed. The energy is redirected to an MGU. 
Megajoule (MJ): The megajoule (MJ) is equal to one million (106) joules, or approximately the 
kinetic energy of a one megagram (tonne) vehicle moving at 160 km/h. One kilowatt hour of 
electricity is 3.6 megajoules. 
Motor Generator Unit (MGU): Device that converts mechanical and/or heat energy to electrical 
energy. In a second time, it sends back the energy created to the powertrain. 
MGU-H: It converts heat energy from exhaust gases to electricity. 
MGU-K: It converts kinetic energy from breaking to electricity. 
Supercapacitor: A system that stores energy electrochemically on the surface of electrodes 
allowing a fast energy absorption and delivery. However, the amount of energy storage is 
relative to the surface used limiting the storage. The energy is redirected to an MGU.  
World Endurance Championship (WEC): Edurance world championship organised by the ACO 
and the FIA.  
 
  
58 
TABLE A2 
Detailed qualitative codification of innovation at the firm level 
 
    2012 2013 2014 2015 
Environment 
level 
Magnitude of regulation change Radical  Incremental Radical  Incremental 
Direction of regulation change Permissive Permissive Restrictive Restrictive 
  
 
        
  
 
        
Firm level 
First Ranked (winner) Audi R18 e-tron Audi R18 e-tron Toyota TS040 Porsche 919 
Core Subsystem innovation Incremental: 
- Improved 
carbon fiber 
monocoque 
coupled from 
previous 
versions, with a 
modified chassis 
to host the 
hybrid 
powertrain 
Incremental: 
- No structural 
re-design but 
several changes 
mostly aimed at 
reducing the 
overall weight.  
Radical: 
 - Radically new 
chassis made with 
lightweight 
materials and new 
aerodynamic 
package.  
- The car is 10cm 
narrower and with 
narrower tyres as 
well and a new 
overall concept. It 
also features new 
safety items such 
as wheel tethers, a 
rear crash 
structure, new 
requirements for 
driver visibility 
and side-impact 
reinforcement. 
 Incremental: 
- The basis of 
the chassis 
structure 
remains 
unchanged but 
it is lighter and 
more rigid. 
- Three 
aerodynamics 
packages to 
adapt to each 
track. 
Peripheral Subsystem innovation Radical: 
- Innovative 
flywheel ERS 
"borrowed" 
from the sister 
Incremental: 
- Improved 
hybrid 
structure; new 
rear wing 
Radical: 
- Brand-new 
engine (from 3.4 to 
3.7 liters) and ERS 
system coupled to 
Incremental: 
- Hybrid 
system 
modifications 
to increase the 
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company 
Porsche.  
-  First use of a 
diesel-electric 
combination to 
design the first 
four-wheel drive 
in a racing 
series. . 
- Moderate 
evolution of the 
2011 3.7 liter 
V6 TDI engine. 
- New carbon-
fiber composite 
gear-box to 
reduce the 
weight.  
design and new 
exhaust system. 
an additional MGU 
transforming the 
car to a four-wheel 
drive with 998 hp. 
The TS040 was the 
first car in 
endurance racing 
that could recover 
energy from the 
four wheels. 
power released 
(from 6MJ in 
2014 to 8MJ in 
2015) 
 
        
Second ranked Toyota TS030 Toyota TS030 Audi R18 e-tron Audi R18 e-tron 
Core Subsystem innovation Incremental: 
- New carbon-
fiber 
monocoque 
coupled with a 
highly modified 
chassis to 
support the 
hybrid system. 
Incremental: 
 - Lighter 
chassis based 
on the older 
2012 design, 
and some minor 
updates for the 
aerodynamic 
package. 
- Reorganized 
the space by 
pushing back 
and re-
centralizing the 
driver position 
that 
Incremental:  
 
- Brand new 
chassis and 
bodywork to 
reduce weight and 
increase rigidity. 
Incremental: 
 - Aerodynamic 
drag reduced 
with large air 
inlets in the 
front wheel 
arches. 
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incrementally 
improved the 
prototype’s 
mass 
displacement. 
Peripheral Subsystem innovation Radical: 
  - 
Supercapacitor 
used as a 
storage system 
for the first time 
in a motor sport 
series. 
- Normally 
aspirated 3.4 
liter V8 engine 
coupled with an 
ERS releasing 
energy to the 
rear axle 
allowing 
additional boost 
use at any 
speed. 
Incremental: 
- New 
supercapacitor 
components 
designed by the 
partner Denso. 
- Removal of 
the deactivated 
MGU in front 
axle. 
Incremental: 
- Traditional 
engine 4.0 liter V6 
TDI.  
Incremental: 
 - Storage 
system 
capacity 
increased and 
doubled power 
released by the 
hybrid system 
(from 2MJ in 
2014 to 4MJ in 
2015). 
Third ranked - - Porsche 919 Toyota TS040 
Core Subsystem innovation - - Radical: 
- Innovative and 
complex car with 
unique and 
complex 
suspension system, 
and new 
aerodynamics. 
Incremental:  
- Chassis and 
suspension 
system 
improvement 
to reduce tire 
wear and some 
aerodynamic 
updates. 
- Redesigning 
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the front end, 
the 
aerodynamics 
package has 
been 
thoroughly 
revised, the 
suspension 
reconfigured 
and extra 
weight has 
been cut. 
- Two aero 
kits: one for 
high-speed 
circuits with 
reduced drag, 
and the other 
for tighter 
tracks requiring 
increased 
downforce. 
Peripheral Subsystem innovation - - Radical: 
- New 2.0-liter 
engine pioneering 
a V4 architecture 
coupled to a double 
hybrid system. 
- Groundbreaking 
hybrid system 
combining two 
ERS systems. The 
first one collecting 
kinetic energy 
from braking; the 
second one 
No change: 
- 
  
62 
collecting waste 
heat from exhaust 
gases, allowing the 
car to continuously 
recover energy al 
through the race.  
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TABLE A3a 
Toyota’s general and specialised knowledge  (2012-2015) 
 
      2012 2013 2014 2015 
Firm Subsystem 
Main 
techn
ologie
s 
adopt
ed 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
TOYOTA 
Peripheral 
subsyst
ems 
ERS: 
Super
capaci
tor 
From 
other 
series: 
inspire
d by 
Toyot
a 
Supra 
2007. 
n.a. 
From 
other 
series: 
inspire
d by 
Toyot
a 
Supra 
2007. 
From 
LMP1
:  
optimi
zation
s 
design
ed by 
DENS
O 
(Toyot
a's 
compa
ny) to 
deliver 
up to 
300ps. 
From 
other 
series: 
inspire
d by 
Toyot
a 
Supra 
2007. 
From 
LMP1
: 
Impro
ved 
design 
of the 
techno
logy 
used 
in 
2013. 
From 
other 
series: 
inspire
d by 
Toyot
a 
Supra 
2007. 
From 
LMP1
: prior 
techno
logy. 
Transmiss
ion, 4 
Wheel 
Drive, 
Gearb
ox 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
From 
LMP1
: 4 
wheel 
drive 
ERS 
power
ed by 
n.a. 
From 
LMP1
: prior 
techno
logy. 
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two 
MGU 
previo
usly 
tested 
in 
2012. 
Core 
subsyst
ems 
V8 engine 
From 
other 
series:  
Toyot
a 
Super 
GT 
3.4-
liter 
V-8 
for 
Japane
se 
series. 
n.a. 
From 
other 
series:  
Toyot
a 
Super 
GT 
3.4-
liter 
V-8 
for 
Japane
se 
series. 
From 
LMP1
: Same 
2012 
engine 
with 
update
s for 
increa
sing 
power. 
From 
other 
series:  
Toyot
a 
Super 
GT 
3.4-
liter 
V-8 
for 
Japane
se 
series. 
New, 
bigger 
engine 
derive
d from 
the 
former 
V8 
used 
in 
2012 
and 
2013. 
From 
other 
series:  
Toyot
a 
Super 
GT 
3.4-
liter 
V-8 
for 
Japane
se 
series. 
From 
LMP1
: prior 
techno
logy. 
                  
Chassis, 
Aerod
ynami
cs 
From 
Formu
la 1: 
Exhau
st 
design 
and 
others 
in line 
with 
Toyot
a F1 
car. 
From 
LMP1
: 
Gener
al 
design 
widely 
inspire
d by 
Peuge
ot 908 
Hybri
d4 
LMP1 
From 
Formu
la 1: 
Exhau
st 
design 
and 
others 
in line 
with 
Toyot
a F1 
car. 
From 
LMP1
: 
Revise
d 
aerody
namic
s 
packa
ge 
includi
ng 
update
d 
From 
Formu
la 1: 
Exhau
st 
design 
and 
others 
in line 
with 
Toyot
a F1 
car. 
From 
LMP1
: 
Major 
evoluti
on of 
the 
2013's 
model 
with 
ambiti
ous 
aerody
From 
Formu
la 1: 
Exhau
st 
design 
and 
others 
in line 
with 
Toyot
a F1 
car. 
From 
LMP1
: 
impro
vemen
t of 
prior 
aero 
packa
ge. 
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(2011)
. 
monoc
oque. 
namic
s. 
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TABLE A3b 
Audi’s general and specialised knowledge (2012-2015) 
 
      2012 2013 2014 2015 
Fir
m Subsystem 
Main 
technolo
gies 
adopted 
General 
knowl
edge 
Specialised 
knowl
edge 
General 
knowl
edge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
General 
knowl
edge 
Specialised 
knowled
ge 
General 
knowl
edge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., applied 
in  
LMP1). 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., applied 
in  
LMP1). 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
AU
D
I 
Peripheral 
subsyst
ems 
ERS: 
Flywheel 
From other 
series: 
Borro
wed 
from 
2010 
Porsch
e 911 
GT3-R 
hybrid  
system 
(forme
rly 
develo
ped by 
Willia
ms 
F1). 
n.a. 
From other 
series: 
Borro
wed 
from 
2010 
Porsch
e 911 
GT3-R 
hybrid  
system 
(forme
rly 
develo
ped by 
Willia
ms 
F1). 
From LMP1: 
2012 
Flywhee
l with 
slightly 
increase
d 
capacity. 
From other 
series: 
Borro
wed 
from 
2010 
Porsch
e 911 
GT3-R 
hybrid  
system 
(forme
rly 
develo
ped by 
Willia
ms 
F1). 
From LMP1: 
design of 
a 
Porsche-
inspired 
rear ERS 
from 
exhaust 
pipes (not 
impleme
nted). 
From other 
series: 
Borro
wed 
from 
2010 
Porsch
e 911 
GT3-R 
hybrid  
system 
(forme
rly 
develo
ped by 
Willia
ms 
F1). 
From 
LMP1: 
Prior 
year 
ERS 
now 
upgrad
ed to 
4MJ. 
Transmission, 
4 Wheel 
Drive, 
Gearbox 
From 
standar
d 
roadcar
s: 
Four-
wheel 
inspire
d fom 
n.a. 
From 
standar
d 
roadcar
s: 
Four-
wheel 
inspire
d fom 
From LMP1: 
2012 4 
Wheel 
drive 
transmis
sion. 
From 
standar
d 
roadcar
s: 
Four-
wheel 
inspire
d fom 
From LMP1: 
Lighter 
electric 
motor on 
the front 
axle. 
From 
standar
d 
roadcar
s: 
Four-
wheel 
inspire
d fom 
From 
LMP1: 
prior 
technol
ogy. 
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standar
d cars 
Peugeo
t. 
Gearbo
x 
inspire
d by 
F1. 
standar
d cars 
Peugeo
t. 
Gearbo
x 
inspire
d by 
F1. 
standar
d cars 
Peugeo
t. 
Gearbo
x 
inspire
d by 
F1. 
standar
d cars 
Peugeo
t. 
Gearbo
x 
inspire
d by 
F1. 
Core 
subsyst
ems 
V6 TDI 
engine n.a. 
From 
LMP1: 
From 
2011's 
Audi 
R18 e-
tron 
model 
(same 
engine)
. 
n.a. 
From LMP1: 
V6 TDI 
engine 
from 
2012. 
n.a. 
From LPM1: 
Increased 
size for 
the 2013, 
V6 4.0 
liter 
engine . 
n.a. 
From 
LMP1: 
Previou
s 
engine, 
now 
more 
powerf
ul. 
Update
d parts 
from 
2014. 
Chassis, 
Aerodyna
mics 
n.a. 
From  
LMP1: 
Audi 
2011's 
model. 
n.a. 
From LMP1: 
New 
rear 
wings 
inspired 
by 
Toyota 
TS030. 
n.a. 
From LMP1: 
Incremen
tal 
evolution
s from 
2013's 
model 
new front 
wings 
and 
bodywor
ks 
elements. 
n.a. 
From 
LMP1: 
new 
front 
wings 
and 
sidepos
ts. 
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TABLE A3c 
Porsche’s general and specialised knowledge (2012-2015) 
 
      2012 2013 2014 2015 
Firm Subsystem 
Main 
technol
ogies 
adopted 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
General 
knowle
dge 
Specialised 
knowle
dge 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
(i.e., road 
cars, or 
other 
racing 
series). 
(i.e., 
applied 
in  
LMP1)
. 
PORSCHE 
Peripheral 
subsys
tems 
ERS: 
Lithium-
ion 
Batterie
s 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
From high-
perfor
mance 
roadcar
s:  
A123 
System
s 
lithium
-ion 
batterie
s, used 
on 
Merced
es-
Benz 
S400 
Hybrid 
model 
and 
Poråsc
he 919 
Hybrid. 
Read 
exhaust 
ERS is 
inspire
n.a. 
From high-
perfor
mance 
roadcar
s:  
A123 
System
s 
lithium
-ion 
batterie
s, used 
on 
Merced
es-
Benz 
S400 
Hybrid 
model 
and 
Poråsc
he 919 
Hybrid. 
Read 
exhaust 
ERS is 
inspire
From 
LMP1: 
exactly 
same 
battery 
storage 
than in 
2014. 
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d by 
Formul
a 1 
cars.  
d by 
Formul
a 1 
cars.  
Transmissio
n, 4 
Wheel 
Drive, 
Gearbox 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
From 
Formul
a 1: 
rear-
drive 
from 
Hybrid 
F1. 
From 
LMP1: 
from 
MGU 
drive 
inspire
d by 
Audi 
and 
Toyota 
LMP1. 
From 
Formul
a 1: 
rear-
drive 
from 
Hybrid 
F1. 
From 
LMP1: 
Some 
change
s from 
2014 
but 
followi
ng the 
same 
technol
ogy. 
MGU 
(8MJ) 
with 
increas
ed 
power.  
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Core 
subsys
tems 
V4 engine n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
From other 
series: 
Lancia 
Fulvia 
1972; 
motobi
ke 
industr
y V4 
archite
cture.  
n.a. 
From other 
series: 
Lancia 
Fulvia 
1972; 
motobi
ke 
industr
y V4 
archite
cture.  
From 
LMP1: 
Evoluti
on 
from 
2014's 
model: 
new 
twin 
exhaust 
system
s to 
make 
the 
engine 
lighter. 
Chassis, 
Aerodyn
amics 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
From other 
LMP1 
cars: 
copied 
general 
design 
from 
Audi 
and 
Toyota.  
n.a. 
From 
LMP1: 
Evoluti
on 
from 
2014's 
model, 
now in 
a single 
piece; 
also, 
new 
nose 
and 
other 
aerody
namics 
elemen
ts. 
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TABLE A4 
Individual race results (2012-2015) 
 
Race 2012 ranking 2013 ranking 2014 ranking 2015 ranking 
12 Hours of Sebring 
 
 
1. Audi R18 Ultra TDI 
2. Audi R18 Ultra TDI 
3. HPD-Honda 
 
- - - 
WEC 6 Hours of 
Silverstone 
 
 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 Ultra TDI 
3. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
1. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
2. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
3. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
3. Toyota TS040 
WEC 6 Hours of Spa-
Francochamps 
 
 
 
1. Audi R18 Ultra TDI 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Audi R18 Ultra TDI 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
 
1. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
3. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
24 Hours of Le Mans 
 
 
 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Audi R18 Ultra TDI 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
 
1. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
2. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
WEC 6 Hours of Sao 
Paulo 
 
 
 
1. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Audi R18 Ultra TDI 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Lola 
1. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
2. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
 
- 
 
6 Hours of Bahrain 
 
 
 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. HPD-Honda 
1. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Orica 
1. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
2. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
3. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
 
1. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
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6 Hours of Fuji 
 
 
 
 
1. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
1. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Lola 
1. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
2. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
3. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
 
1. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
2. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
6 Hours of Shanghai 
 
 
 
 
1. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
1. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
2. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
3. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
1. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
2. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro  
 
6 Hours of Circuit of 
the Americas 
 
 - 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Toyota TS030 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
1. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Toyota TS040 Hybrid 
 
1. Porsche 919 hybrid 
2. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
3. Audi R19 e-tron 
Quattro 
6 Hours of 
Nürburgring 
 
 
- - - 
1. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
2. Porsche 919 Hybrid 
3. Audi R18 e-tron 
Quattro 
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TABLE A5 
LMP1 Grand Prix details (2012-2015) 
 
Sequence Year  Date   Race   Circuit   Length m  Nr. Laps   Distance km  
1 2012 17-Mar Sebring  Sebring  6019 325 1956.175 
2 2012 5-May Spa-Francorchamps  Spa-Francorchamps  7004 160 1120.64 
3 2012 17-Jun Le Mans 24h  Le Mans  13629 378 5151.762 
4 2012 26-Aug Silverstone  Silverstone  5891 194 1142.854 
5 2012 15-Sep Sao Paulo  Interlagos  4309 247 1064.323 
6 2012 29-Sep Bahrain  Bahrain  5412 191 1033.692 
7 2012 14-Oct Fuji  Fuji  4563 233 1063.179 
8 2012 28-Oct Shanghai  Shanghai  5451 191 1041.141 
1 2013 14-Apr Silverstone  Silverstone  5891 197 1160.527 
2 2013 4-May Spa-Francorchamps  Spa-Francorchamps  7004 168 1176.672 
3 2013 22-Jun Le Mans 24h  Le Mans  13629 348 4742.892 
4 2013 1-Sep Sao Paulo  Interlagos  4309 235 1012.615 
5 2013 22-Sep Americas  Americas  5513 187 1030.931 
6 2013 20-Oct Fuji  Fuji  4563 16 73.008 
7 2013 9-Nov Shanghai  Shanghai  5451 190 1035.69 
8 2013 30-Nov Bahrain  Bahrain  5412 199 1076.739 
1 2014 20-Apr Silverstone  Silverstone  5890.8 167 983.764 
2 2014 3-May Spa-Francorchamps  Spa-Francorchamps  7003.9 171 1197.667 
3 2014 15-Jun Le Mans 24h  Le Mans  13629 379 5165.391 
4 2014 20-Sep Americas  Americas  5513 157 865.541 
5 2014 12-Oct Fuji  Fuji  4563 236 1076.868 
6 2014 2-Nov Shanghai  Shanghai  5451 188 1024.788 
7 2014 15-Nov Bahrain  Bahrain  5412 195 1055.34 
8 2014 30-Nov Sao Paulo  Interlagos  4309 249 1072.941 
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1 2015 12-Apr Silverstone  Silverstone  5901 201 1186.101 
2 2015 2-May Spa-Francorchamps  Spa-Francorchamps  7003.9 176 1232.686 
3 2015 13-Jun Le Mans 24h  Le Mans  13629 395 5383.455 
4 2015 30-Aug Nürburgring  Nürburgring  5137 203 1042.811 
5 2015 19-Sep Americas  Americas  5513 185 1019.905 
6 2015 11-Oct Fuji  Fuji  4563 216 985.608 
7 2015 1-Nov Shanghai  Shanghai  5451 169 921.219 
8 2015 21-Nov Bahrain  Bahrain  5412 199 1076.988 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A6 
LMP1 Championship results and points (2012-2015) 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
Team Rank Points Team Rank Points Team Rank Points Team Rank Points 
Audi 1 173 Audi 1 207 Toyota 1 289 Porsche 1 344 
Toyota 2 96 Toyota 2 142.5 Audi 2 244 Audi 2 264 
      Porsche 3 193 Toyota 3 164 
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TABLE A7 
Visual comparison of competing technologies in WEC LMP1-H (2014) 
Car model Hybrid components 
Porsche 919 Hybrid 
 
1. MGU-K recovering the 
kinetic energy produced 
while braking. It also 
supplies power to the 
front rears. 
2. Lithium-ion batteries 
storing the energy 
produced by both the 
MGU-K and MGU-H 
3. MGU-H recovering the 
energy from the exhaust 
heats. It uses an electric 
generator powered by the 
flow of gases and is 
linked to the 
turbocharger of the 
engine. 
Toyota TS040 
 
1. Front MGU-K 
recovering kinetic energy 
and supplies power to the 
front wheels. 
2. V-8 engine. 
3. Supercapacitor storing 
the energy produced by 
the two MGU-K devices. 
4. Rear MGU-K with same 
functionalities than the 
one on the front but 
linked to the rear axle. 
 
1. 
2. 3. 
3. 
4. 
2. 
1. 
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Audi R18 e-tron
 
1. MGU-K linked to the 
front axle. 
2. Flywheel using a rotor 
that mechanically stores 
the energy recovered by 
the MGU-K. It also re-
direct the energy to the 
MGU-K. 
3. V-6 TDI Diesel engine. 
 
APPENDIX B 
MINI CASE STUDIES 
 
AUDI MOTORSPORT 
Team History 
Audi is a German automotive company, sub-division of Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Group 
(VAG) where Porsche is also one of the brands. The sport department at Audi, called Audi Motorsport, 
was created in 1979 in Ingolstadt where the headquarter of the brand is still based. Mainly focus on the 
world rally championship, the department was originally created to develop what made Audi famous for, 
the so called ‘Quattro system’. This center differential all-wheel drive system established a new 
technological standard not only in motorsport, but also in the entire automobile industry. After almost a 
decade of success crowned by two world champion titles in 1982 and 1984, Audi withdrew from rallying 
in 1986. Later, Audi focused on circuit racing with a first experience in the American TransAm series in 
1988 and then in the German touring car series DTM from 1990, where it collected several prizes such as 
7 championship titles. Yet, the endurance series is the racing category where Audi has outclassed its 
competitors during more than a decade with 13 victories in Le Mans between 1999 and 2016.  
 
Audi Motorsport in endurance since 1999 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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Audi Motorsport took part for the first time in the endurance championship in 1999 with the R8R 
model. While the overall design and assembly was developed in Ingolstadt, Germany under the direction 
of Dr. Wolfgang Ullrich—also known as called “Mister Le Mans”—the chassis was developed by the 
Italian specialist Dallara in Parma. Audi also chose to build its endurance car in association with Joest 
Racing, a former Porsche’s partner in endurance racing. From 2000 and thanks to an advanced 
development of the R8 model, Audi won almost every edition of the 24 hours Le Mans race, being the 
first constructor ever in history winning this prestigious and challenging race with a direct injection 
engine in 2000, with a diesel engine in 2006, and with a hybrid system in 2012. For many experts—and 
despite the modest R&D budget—Audi’s key to success was the ability to innovate and always evolve 
over and beyond its competitors. Also, Audi always worked with the most experience endurance drivers 
through its life: Tom Kristensen, Emanuele Pirro André Lotterer and Marcel Fassler, among others. 
 
Main sources 
http://www.audi.com/corporate/en/company/history/motorsport.html 
https://www.carwow.co.uk/guides/glossary/audi-quattro-system-explained 
http://www.veloce.co.uk/shop/graphics/pdf/V4327.pdf 
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TOYOTA MOTORSPORT GMBH 
Team History 
Toyota Motorsport GmBh (TMG) is a subdivision of the Japanese automaker Toyota and is currently 
is based in Cologne, Germany employing around 200 people. This plant was established in 1979 under 
the name Andersson Motorsport GmbH originally for its World Rally Championship program. By the end 
of the program in 1999, Toyota had won three rally world championships as manufacturer. In 1998, TMG 
entered the endurance series with the car model TSO20 but closed its program two years later after losing 
the 24h of Le Mans in 1999. Meanwhile, TMG developed a Formula One division and entered the F1 
Championship in 2002. TMG was one of the few constructors designing and building both car and 
engine. From 2002 to the end of the program in 2009—and despite the huge resources deployed—Toyota 
disappointingly did not win any race but finished 13 times on podium. The F1 program corresponded to a  
heavy investment in Toyota’s Cologne facilities. The high performance infrastructures—such as wind 
tunnels and several test rings—were rented to different F1 teams and motorsport companies between 2009 
and 2012. In 2012, TMG returned to the endurance racing with an innovative hybrid car named TS030. 
Recently, Toyota decided to join all its motorsports activities under the name “Gazoo Racing”. This 
included its endurance program.  
 
TMG endurance team since 2012 
TMG was responsible for more than 80% of components in the TS030, the first WEC model 
presented in 2012. The rest of the car’s elements were designed and manufactured back in Japan by few 
Toyota’s partners such as Denso, which was working on the Hybrid System in collaboration with the 
Toyota’s motorsport division based in Higashifuji. Since 2012 and its return in endurance, Toyota has 
worked in partnership with ORECA Racing, an experienced French team—21 entries at Le Mans—that 
offered operational support to the Japanese constructor. Not surprisingly, TMG’s 9 year experience in F1 
allowed the team to adapt several technologies from F1 to the their WEC vehicles. By hiring in 2012 the 
former F1’s driver Sebastien Buemi as well as the endurance specialist such as Stephan Sarrazin as main 
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drivers, TMG made a major investment in experienced sportsmen despite deploying a budget that was 
inferior to competitors.  
 
 
Main sources 
http://www.autoblog.com/2015/04/10/toyota-gazoo-racing-official/ 
http://www.toyota-motorsport.com/en/f-heritage 
http://www.f1fanatic.co.uk/f1-information/f1-teams/toyota/ 
http://www.racecar-engineering.com/news/toyota-ts030-lmp1-hybrid-revealed/ 
http://www.racecar-engineering.com/news/revised-toyota-ts030-shown-off/ 
http://www.oreca.com/racing-2/ 
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PORSCHE AG MOTORSPORT 
Team History  
Porsche AG Motorsport is a subdivision of Porsche AG, a German car manufacturer based in 
Stuttgart. Porsche itself is owned by Volkswagen AG which is also majority-owned by Porsche’s Holding 
since 2012. Porsche is considered as the most successful race car manufacturer in endurance, with 18 
victories in the prestigious 24h of Le Mans, the last one won in 2016. Even when Porsche was not 
competing in the LMP1 top category as official manufacturer, it built and sold different 911 racing 
models to private teams to compete in the GT category. Porsche had abandoned the factory motorsports 
program after its success in Le Mans in 1998. This departure corresponded to a period of financial 
difficulties for the firm, and its cession to the WV group. The latter had already massively invested in 
Audi’s endurance program since 1999, so it was a problem for WV group to enrol Porsche as a competing 
factory team in LMP1 again its very own Audi. However, in 2005 Porsche worked closely with a private 
team (the American team Penske) to run a RS Spyder prototype in the LMP2 category. Before its return 
in the top-category as manufacturer with the prototype 919 Hybrid, Porsche also run two official 911 RSR 
in the GT category from 2013. In 2014, Porsche came back to the competition with two GT cars and two 
prototypes equipped with advanced technology. Its objective was to use its endurance program as an 
R&D lab to develop its future hybrid production cars.  
 
Porsche AG Motorsport in LMP1 since 2014 
Industry experts agree that Porsche came back in endurance with the largest budget ever seen in the 
series—financial resources were comparable to a top team in F1 (i.e., around $300 million per season). In 
order to develop a competitive car, Porsche invested in new facilities in Weissah and formed a new team 
from scratch by hiring more than 200 professionals, including several high quality engineers mostly 
coming from F1. Different specialised companies such as Bosch and A123 worked closely with Porsche 
on the car’s battery system for the hybrid engine. The extraordinary expertise of both suppliers and 
engineers allowed Porsche to present the most innovative car ever seen since a long time in the series. 
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Notable former F1 drivers such as Nico Hulkenberg and Mark Webber  joined the Porsche AG team in 
WEC. 
Main sources 
Porsche AG Motorsporthttp://www.les24heures.fr/index.php/database/palmaresdes24hdumans 
http://www.teampenske.com/ 
https://newsroom.porsche.com/en/motorsports/le-mans-porsche-technology-919-hybrid-911-rsr-11084.html 
http://www.evo.co.uk/porsche/911/13127/porsche-911-rsr-races-at-le-mans 
http://www.racecar-engineering.com/cars/porsche-919/ 
 
